Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!caip!topaz!ll-xn!nike!ucbcad!ucbvax!SRI-KL!PHayes
From: PHayes@SRI-KL (Pat Hayes)
Newsgroups: mod.ai
Subject: Re: AIList Digest V4 #166
Message-ID: <8607181855.AA27986@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Tue, 15-Jul-86 15:31:07 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8607181855.AA27986
Posted: Tue Jul 15 15:31:07 1986
Date-Received: Sat, 19-Jul-86 03:47:25 EDT
References: <AIList-REQUEST@SRI-AI>
Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Organization: The ARPA Internet
Lines: 32
Approved: ailist@sri-ai.arpa

re: Searles chinese room
There has been by now an ENORMOUS amount of discussion of this argument, far
more than it deserves.  For a start, check out the BBS treatment surrounding
the original paper, with all the commentaries and replies. 
Searle's position is quite coherent and rational, and ultimately
whether or not he is right will have to be decided empirically, I
believe.  This is not to say that all his arguments are good, but
that's a different question. He thinks that whatever it is about the
brain ( or perhaps the whole organism ) which gives it the power of
intentional thought will be something biological. No mechanical
electronic device will therefore really be able to *think about* the
world in the way we can.  An artificial brain might be able to, it's
not a matter of natural vs. artificial, notice: and it's just possible
that some other kind of hardware might support intentional thinking,
although he believes not; but certainly, it can't be done by a
representationalist machine, whose behavior is at best a simulation of
thought ( and which, he believes, will never in fact be a successful
simulation ).  Part of this position is that the behavior of a system
is no guide to whether or not it is *really* thinking.  If his closest
friend died, and an autopsy revealed, to Searles great surprise, that
he had been a computational robot all his life, then Searle would say
that the man hadn't been aware of anything all along. The 'Turing test'
is quite unconvincing to Searle.
This intellectual position is quite consistent and impregnable to argument.
It turns ultimately on an almost legal point: if a robot behaves
'intelligently', is that enough reason to attribute 'intelligence'
to it? ( Substitute your favorite psychological predicate. ) Turing and his
successors say yes, Searle says no.  I think all we can do is agree to 
disagree for the time being.  When the robots get to be more convincing, let's
come back and ask him again ( or send one of them to do it ).
Pat Hayes
-------