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From: MUKHOP%RCSJJ%gmr.com@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA
Newsgroups: mod.ai
Subject: Creativity and Analogy
Message-ID: <8607182110.AA00514@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Tue, 15-Jul-86 10:31:00 EDT
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Posted: Tue Jul 15 10:31:00 1986
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  I believe that Jay Weber and I mostly agree on the relation between an 
abstraction and an analogy as well as the relation between the respective 
spaces of abstractions and analogies (linguistic "slipperiness" 
notwithstanding). What I disagreed with is the notion of some absolute 
abstraction hierarchy implicit in Jay's comments:

> ...  Each analogy corresponds to a node in an abstraction hierarchy which 
> relates all of the sub-categories, SO THE SPACE OF ANALOGIES MAPS ONTO THE
> SPACE OF ABSTRACTIONS,.....

  The distinction between an absolute abstraction hierarchy and multiple 
abstraction lattices (the term I used in an earlier communication) is central 
to the discussion of creativity, that is if you accept that creativity is 
the art of making INTERESTING analogies (or abstractions). 
Implicit in this definition is a choice between candidate analogies--a choice 
not available in an abstraction hierarchy. In all fairness, Jay never states 
explicitly that the world can only be represented by a single abstraction 
hierarchy. 

>   Proper scientists (by definition) do not construct theories about things
> that cannot be empirically examined, e.g. using structure mapping functions
> to model the communal descriptive definition of the English word
> "creativity".  Scientists pick testable domains such as problem solving
> where you can test predictions of a particular theory with respect to
> correct problem solving.  

  I am surprised  by Jay's definition of "proper scientists". As to modeling 
the communal descriptive definition of "creativity", how else could one begin
to emulate this elusive property? I am surprised at his choice of a model
problem for "proper scientists"--something as general as
problem solving. If problem solving by induction or by analogy are proper 
domains, why isn't problem solving by "creativity" acceptable? The fact that
the word means slightly different things to different people does not justify
its exclusion from the class of "proper domains". It is fairly obvious that
we have similar perceptions about what the word "creativity" means--how
else could we be having this discussion? 

> In the past, scientists have left debate over
> such concepts as "truth" and "beauty" to philosophers, and I think we
> should do the same with "creativity" and "intelligence".  

  Who are the "we" in this sentence? If "we" refers to the AIList, doesn't 
that include philosophers interested in AI?

> In Cognitive Science, researchers have too often exaggerated the impact 
> of their work through the careless and unscientific use of such terms.

  What is the lesson to be learnt here? Do not use words like "creativity"
that sound pompous? If I want to develop a program that has this interesting 
property I will need to give this property a name. What would be more natural 
than "creativity"?