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From: eyal@wisdom.BITNET (Eyal mozes)
Newsgroups: mod.ai
Subject: Re: Searle and understanding
Message-ID: <8607241734.AA17528@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Thu, 24-Jul-86 13:35:08 EDT
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Posted: Thu Jul 24 13:35:08 1986
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>I think the example shows that there are two related meanings
>of "understanding".  Certainly, in a formal, scientific sense,
>ETS knows (understands-1) as much about yellow as anyone - all
>the associated wavelengths, retinal reactions, brain-states,
>etc.  He can use this concept in formal systems, manipulate it,
>etc. But *something* is missing - ETS doesn't know
>(understand-2) "what it's like to see yellow", to borrow/bend
>Nagel's phrase.
>
> It's this "what it's like to be a subject experiencing X" that
> eludes capture (I suppose) by AI systems.  And I think the
> point of the Chinese room example is the same - the system as
> a whole *does* understand-1 Chinese, but doesn't understand-2
> Chinese.

No, I think you're missing Searle's point.

What you call "understanding-2" is applicable only to a very small
class of concepts - to concepts of sensory qualities, which can't be
conveyed verbally. For the concept of a color, you don't even have to
stipulate ETS; any color-blind person with a fair knowledge of physical
optics (and I happen to be such a person) has "understanding-1", but
not "understanding-2", of the concept; I know the conditions which
cause other people to see that color, I can reason about it, but I
don't know what it feels like to see it. But for concepts which don't
directly involve sensory qualities (for example, for understanding a
language) there can be only "understanding-1".

Now, Searle's point is that this "understanding-1" (such as a native
Chinese's understanding of the Chinese language, or my understanding of
colors) involves intentionality; it does not consist of manipulating
uninterpreted symbols by formal rules. That is why he denies that a
computer program can have it.

Those who think Searle sees something "magical" in human understanding
also miss his point. Quite on the contrary, he regards understanding as
a completely natural phenomenon, which, like all natural phenomena,
depends on specific material causes. To quote from his paper "Minds,
Brains and Programs": "Whatever else intentionality is, it is a
biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be as causally dependent
on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation,
photosynthesis, or any other biological phenomena. No one would suppose
that we could produce milk and sugar by running a computer simulation
of the formal sequences in lactation and photosynthesis, but where the
mind is concerned many people are willing to believe in such a miracle
because of a deep and abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a
matter of formal processes and is independent of quite specific
material causes in the way that milk and sugar are not".

        Eyal Mozes

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