Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!seismo!brl-adm!caip!topaz!ll-xn!nike!ucbcad!ucbvax!sdcsvax!sdcc6!sdcc3!ln63szf From: ln63szf@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU (Rick Frey) Newsgroups: net.ai,net.philosophy,net.cog-eng Subject: Re: Gibson's theory of perception Message-ID: <3483@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU> Date: Sun, 20-Jul-86 17:22:30 EDT Article-I.D.: sdcc3.3483 Posted: Sun Jul 20 17:22:30 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 21-Jul-86 23:42:10 EDT References: <1782@mtuxo.UUCP> Organization: U.C. San Diego, Academic Computer Center Lines: 123 Summary: What a topic! Xref: mnetor net.ai:1055 net.philosophy:2184 net.cog-eng:234 I haven't read Kelley's book either, but I'm pretty familiar with Gibson and a few of the major problems in his theory, most of which you present. In article <1782@mtuxo.UUCP>, hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) writes: > In the > standard contemporary conceptualization of perception, from which Gibson > dissented, the input to the perceptual process is thought to be the > sensory impression; for example, in visual perception, the pattern of > retinal stimulation. Here you start off a bit unclear. When you talk about input to the perceptual process, to what are you referring? The signals that will travel down the optic nerve? What will end up in the occipital cortex? Area 17? You need to be more specific, as did Gibson. > If the perceptual system is > thought of as physically limited to the eye and the brain, the standard > view is close to being a logical necessity. It is from this > conceptualization that Gibson dissented. A distinction that most physiological psychologists won't make. All (all good) PS's know that at some point, information about the regularities of the external world need to be used in order to make sense out of visual stimuli. Helmholz, Rock and some others say that this information comes in the form of conscious structuring of visual information whereas Ramachandran and some others say that the regularities of the external world are hard wired into the perceptual features of the system. Thus the Phi phenomenon (illusory motion) isn't do to a conscious realization that objects blinking between two locations might be moving between them, it's do to a hardwired understanding that in the real world, objects have to travel through paths to get to another location; blinking is impossible. > In Gibson's view, the perceptual system is not limited to the confines > of the organism, but extends into the environment. In the course of its > evolution, the organism has assimilated physical mechanisms present in > its natural environment to function as integral parts of its perceptual > system. This isn't only Gibson's idea. I'm not sure on who came up with it first, but he certainly isn't the sole posessor of the idea. > In this view, the > natural light sources present in the environment, the reflective > properties of the surfaces of objects, and the optical characteristics > of the atmosphere are as much a part of the human perceptual system as > the eyes and the brain. Thus, the retinal stimulation pattern is not the > input to perception, but rather an internal stage in the process. The > input to the perceptual process is the object itself; Gibson's major mistake. This simply isn't true. Obviously it has to be the light that makes it to the organism. If no light reaches the organism, then there's no perception. Period. Unless the organism *perceives* the object, it doesn't exist to the perceiver. Perception starts once there is something to perceive, and that only can begin when perceptual information about the object makes its way to the perceiver. > the output is > organism's awareness of the object. The information contained in this > awareness is the original, and not a re- (or transformed), presentation > of the object to consciousness. Information contained in awareness? This is somewhat Gibsonian in that he uses words that have no clear definitions, but I don't think even he would quite say this. What is awareness? What stage of processing are you referring to? Aside from the actual collection of excited and inhibited receptors at the retinal level, *all* perception is transfor- mation. Sorry, no homunculae. (sp??) > According to Gibson, the experimental psychologist's laboratory use of > two-dimensional representations, tachistoscopic stimuli, illusions, and > other materials that were not part of the ecological environment in > which the human perceptual system evolved, amounts to studying the human > perceptual system with some of its key parts removed. In some cases, this is a valid claim of Gibson's, but his whole theory rests on it and it isn't 100% true. He'd love to have us believe that the external world is rich in information and that perception is an easy task of picking out of the multitude of cues available. That's simply not true. Experimental psychologists aren't blind to this criticism, and far too many experiments have been done that don't fall under Gibson's criticisms of artificiality. Perception developed under situations where the available information was far from over-abundant. Without this over-abundance of information, Gibson's ideas start falling apart. > This is rather like trying to find out how a computer works after > pulling out some of its chips, This is a purely Gibsonian analogy, and accordigly isn't accurate. Studying perception in the laboratory removes nothing from the perceptual machiney. It removes perceptual information that Gibson says has to be there, which, I'm sorry, but you don't get to tell nature "Make sure all the information I need is there or I'm going to screw up." Adaptivity would seem to indicate that an organism that could still make the best judgement with the least information would be the most fit to survive. Perception developed in a piecemeal fashion such that there wasn't an overabundance of information at various stages in the development. So where did this 'perceptual laziness' come into play? You try finding a small tree frog in a huge tree. The whole idea of an overabundance of perceptual information might apply to recognizing people's faces, but it has no basis in the reality of where and how perception developed. > To yield valid information, the results of > such experiments must be interpreted with special attention to the fact > that one is not studying an intact or properly functioning system. True, but with the modified analogy, if you put a number into the computer and get something out, if the machinery is the same in all states (which in reality, it is) you get information any time you put something in and get something out. Don't throw it away because it isn't an exact analogy to the natural environment. You do need to be careful in interpretting what you find, but the answer isn't to say that is's all artificial and the only real perception stems from objects in the natural world. Rick Frey (...ihnp4!sdcsvax!sdcc3!ln63szf) (ln63szf%sdcc3@sdcsvax.UCSD.EDU or .ARPA) (I've been switched temporarily to sdcc3, NOT sdcc7)