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From: carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes)
Newsgroups: net.politics,net.sci
Subject: Re: Nuclear power and risk
Message-ID: <522@gargoyle.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 13-Jul-86 19:59:46 EDT
Article-I.D.: gargoyle.522
Posted: Sun Jul 13 19:59:46 1986
Date-Received: Tue, 15-Jul-86 01:24:43 EDT
References: <445@meccts.UUCP>
Reply-To: carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes)
Organization: U. of Chicago, Computer Science Dept.
Lines: 162
Xref: watmath net.politics:17335 net.sci:1233

[Michael Stein]
>The question of whether nuclear power is safer then the alternatives
>is not something that should be decided by opinion poll.  

But the question of whether we should increase our reliance on
nuclear power should be decided by democratic processes.  Albert
Einstein, considered an expert on nuclear energy, said that
"decisions about nuclear energy should be made in the village
square".

>Trying to get weapons grade fuel from spent nuclear fuel rods is
>*very* difficult.  I won't get into the physics of this now, but
>frankly, it is beyond the capabilities of any third-world nation.

It is no secret that nuclear warheads can be made from
*reactor-grade* plutonium, using published information.  It is risky
but there are no doubt many terrorists and other desperate groups who
would be willing to take such risks (the safe handling of strategic
materials is public knowledge).  Please see the section on nuclear
power in *Brittle Power* by H. and A. Lovins, who discuss this in
detail.  Dozens of tons of Pu are generated annually by reactors
around the world, and much of it is transported.  How are you
planning to keep this out of the "wrong hands" (and prevent sabotage
all along the fuel cycle)?  A police state might be sufficient.  The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says:

 "Societies cannot effectively protect the nuclear fuel cycle against
 sabotage short of converting to a garrison state....
 
 "Plutonium could be stolen and sold on a `black market', or it could
 be ransomed, or a group of criminals might steal plutonium for
 profit, or for use as a nuclear threat to deter police or otherwise
 further their activities.  Or one of the more than 50 terrorist
 groups that are said to exist worldwide might see nuclear weapons as
 means of enhancing its capability to use, or threaten, violence.  Or
 a revolutionary-minded political group within a country might acquire
 nuclear weapons to achieve its political objectives or to deter
 violence against it.  And it should not be forgotten that the danger
 inherent in a crude nuclear device constructed by, for example, a
 terrorist group is not confined to a possible nuclear explosion.  The
 contamination of a large area by high levels of plutonium would be an
 enormous threat in itself."

>The point is not that nuclear power is
>totally safe, it is just far safer then any of the alternatives.  

Safer than the "soft energy paths", which are mixes of solar, wind,
water, biofuel, conservation and other renewable resources, and which
have been extensively discussed in recent years?  And what exactly do
you mean by "safer"?  By putting your argument in these crudely
simplistic terms, you are simply parroting the nuclear industry's
propaganda.  I don't have to read the netnews for this sort of
Orwellian horseshit; I can find it in any advertisement from the
"U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness" (sic) or Chicago's own beloved
Commonwealth Edison.  Do you know why the nuclear industry is
deluging us with a multimillion-dollar ad campaign (with federal
subsidizing) to convince us that nuclear energy is "safe"?  Because
it really *is* as safe as they say it is, that's why, and the
industry's overwhelming concern is the public good.  Big business,
you know, is rarely motivated by such concerns as profits, power, and
job security.  Advertising, you know, is designed to promote clear
thinking, not to manipulate opinions and preferences.

>How then can the average person decide?  One way is by noting what
>the experts in the field feel about the matter.  The Council of
>Scientific Affairs of the AMA has reported nuclear power the electric
>power with least risks in health effects.  The eighteen thousand
>member Power Engineering Society also endorsed nuclear power as the
>safest form of power generation.  So did the Energy Committee of the
>IEEE.  So did the 69,000 member society of Professional Engineers.
>So did the National Council of the thirty-nine thousand member
>American Institute of Chemical Engineers.  So did the Board of
>Directors of the thirty-four hundred member Health Physics Society.

1.  What exactly did these groups claim about nuclear power?  I hope
it was more specific than "nuclear power is the safest form of power
generation", which is too vague for science, but not for propaganda.
Did they take into account such factors as plutonium theft,
proliferation of nuclear weapons, genetic damage which may be
perpetuated for many generations, the unsolved problem of disposal of
wastes, the possibilities of installing smokestack scrubbers and
improved safety measures in coal mines (much room for improvement
here)?  How did they calculate the probability of catastrophic
accidents in the future?  You imply that the "experts" are in solid
agreement, but what about the many physical scientists who disagree
with your evaluation?

2.  Are engineers professionally qualified to evaluate how the
*organizational setting*, the fact that risky systems are operated by
organizations and exist in an environment of organizations, affects
the operation of such systems?  Are they qualified to understand the
nature of risky systems in their social setting?  Since engineers are
not trained in sociology or organization theory, did these groups
take into account the views of experts from such fields (such as
Perrow)?

3.  Are these professional groups interested parties?  Would the
abandonment of or gradual shift away from nuclear power affect their
careers adversely?

4.  Should our collective choice of energy policy be based on *one
number*, a one-dimensional assessment of risk per unit of energy
produced?  Or should a variety of factors, including the distinction
betweeen voluntary and involuntary risk and the way the public
perceives and evaluates risk, be considered?  Perrow puts it well, in
*Complex Organizations* [pp. 153-154]:

 "...a systems analysis discloses that the infrastructure of risk
 analysis and risk assessment that guides the selection and design of
 risky systems -- an infrastructure housed in universities, government
 agencies, and industry trade groups -- reflects its elite origins and
 values.  Experts, largely economists and engineers, help to guide the
 selection and design of risky systems.  We are only beginning to
 understand their legitimization role.  They declare that the public
 is grossly uninformed and irrational in its fear of risky
 technologies; the gap between the experts and the public on these
 policy issues is to be closed by educating the public to agree with
 the experts.  But the experts have a far narrower view of risk and
 benefit than the public does, relying on body counts rather than the
 more social and cultural criteria that the public uses.  Poll data
 indicate the public takes into account such questions as:  Do those
 who bear no risk receive the benefits, while those at risk do not?
 Is there a catastrophic potential -- that is, even if no significant
 radiation has leaked from a nuclear plant accident, what would happen
 in a particularly bad accident? ... Is the technology new and poorly
 understood?  Are the victims related (i.e., killing 50,000 a year on
 the highways is [arguably] not as bad as wiping out a whole community
 of 50,000, because a whole culture is lost in the latter case)?  Will
 future generations be affected?  
 
 "Careful polling has revealed that these social and cultural aspects
 of risk enter into the average citizen's evaluation but not those of
 the experts in the universities, industries, and government
 regulatory bodies.  An organizational analysis of the setting,
 professional training, and organizational ties of these experts makes
 their narrow approach understandable." 

[Comment:  In particular, it shows why "operator error" is so often
the scapegoat, instead of faulty design or management.  Finding that
faulty designs were responsible would entail enormous shutdown and
retrofitting costs; finding that management was responsible would
threaten those in charge; finding that operators were responsible
preserves the system, especially if the operators do not have a
strong union.  TMI was a typical case of blaming the operators
unjustifiably:  based on their instructions and available
information, the operators COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN that they "should
have" done otherwise than what they did.  The Kemeny Commission
reported that "the major cause of the accident was due to
inappropriate actions by those who were operating the plant".  But
Perrow, a consultant to the Commission, shows (in *Normal Accidents*)
that the major cause of TMI was the nature and design of the reactor
system:  interactive complexity in conjunction with tight coupling
makes major accidents *inevitable*.  Thus the industry's promised
"improved operator training" will not significantly improve the
safety of reactors.]

 "The problem of safe systems has generally been defined as an
 engineering one, with some attention by regulatory bodies.  I have
 tried to show that this is a quite incomplete, and often a simply
 wrong, approach."

Richard Carnes