Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!XX.LCS.MIT.EDU!ARMS-D-Request From: ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V7 #2 Message-ID: <8608132248.AA10652@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> Date: Wed, 13-Aug-86 17:20:00 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8608132248.AA10652 Posted: Wed Aug 13 17:20:00 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 14-Aug-86 00:11:27 EDT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 235 Approved: arms-d@xx.lcs.mit.edu Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, August 13, 1986 5:20PM Volume 7, Issue 2 Today's Topics: KAL007 - conclusive evidence exists treaty enforcement The 20% Question or How Much Is It Worth? Star Wars vote ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 12 Aug 86 10:00:06 PDT From: Clifford Johnson Subject: KAL007 - conclusive evidence exists > less than conclusive evidence, even today [that] KAL007 was spying It is incredible that "less than conclusive evidence exists even today," because of the wealth of data witheld by the United States et alia -- the fact that this tragedy uniquely has not been publicly investigated in the United States tends to prove that completely conclusive evidence is so abundant that an inquiry would reveal it. The most "interesting" aspect of the tragedy is why the Soviets *and* United States have collaborated in witholding the conclusive information they both possess. This puzzle is the one good point against the espionage hypothesis, but it would be easy to see why the USSR wouldn't want published how their radar was confused by the USA, and how it took them over two hours even to sight the plane, and how tardy their warning was. Note though that when the Japanese radar tapes were revealed, the route proven was roughly the same as that claimed by Russia, and significantly different from that claimed by the United States. However, the Soviets did hand over hundreds of pieces of metal debris from their naval search, whereas a flotilla of vastly superior US ships insulted us all by declaring the only metal they found was an old ship's cooking pot. To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU ------------------------------ Date: 12 Aug 86 19:43:17 EDT From: Hank.Walker@unh.cs.cmu.edu Subject: treaty enforcement I think all this talk about treaty enforcement is off the mark. There are really two kinds of treaties: treaties between unequal parties, and treaties between equal parties. In the former case, the stronger party forces the weaker party to agree to something. These treaties are enforced by the stronger party through force, threat of force, economic might, etc. In the case of equal parties, the parties agree to something that is in their mutual self-interest. Neither party can force the other to do something against their will. Treaties between the US-SU fall into the equal party category, and consequently only remain in effect as long as both sides perceive the treaty to be in their self-interest. Clauses such as six-month withdrawl periods only exist to cause embarrassment or public ridicule if violated, and cannot be enforced. If a party feels strongly enough, then this ridicule will be ignored. If 90% of the US public wanted to get immediately get rid of the ABM treaty, how long do you think it would be around? ------------------------------ Date: Tuesday, 12 August 1986 16:39-EDT From: Jim Kirby To: arms-d@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Re: The 20% Question or How Much Is It Worth? Posted-Date: Tue, 12 Aug 86 16:39:25 edt Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Organization: Wang Institute of Graduate Studies, Tyngsboro, Mass. An important issue has gone unmentioned in the discussion of whether a BMD that could stop only 20% of the warheads in a ballistic missile attack would be worth having. That issue is the cost of the system. (In this message I am ignoring the effects on US security of possible Soviet responses to such a BMD (such as building twice as many missiles or targeting US satellites).) If building a 20% effective BMD were free, it would be worth having. It might turn out to be useful in some situation. If not, then the US is out nothing. If building such a system were to cost, say, $10 trillion (replace by any ridiculously large sum), then it would not be worth building. There are numerous more effective ways to spend such a sum to increase US security. It is likely that a 20% effective BMD would cost somewhere between zero and $10 trillion. When someone says that such a system is worth building, the question that person must answer is "How much is it worth?" I cannot believe that the answer is "Any amount that we have to spend." Such an answer implies that it is worth letting our children go hungry and uneducated, that it is worth diverting all of our resources to build a system that will protect us from only 20% of the warheads in a nuclear attack. The same argument applies, of course, to a BMD that is 99% or even 100% effective. The point is that ballistic missiles are not the only threat we face in this world nor is defense the only thing on which we want to spend money. Addressing the threat is worth some effort. The question to be answered is "How much is it worth?" -- Jim Kirby kirby@wanginst (Csnet) Wang Institute of Graduate Studies decvax!wanginst!kirby (UUCP) Tyng Road, Tyngsboro, MA 01879 (617) 649-9731 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1986 17:10 EDT From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Subject: Star Wars vote [This message orginally came from CHAPMAN@SU-RUSSELL] The House voted for $3.1 billion in funding for the SDI yesterday, the figure supported by the Federation of American Scientists, UCS, Common Cause and other groups. The $3.1 billion figure was an amendment to the defense authorization bill sponsored by Congressman Charles Bennett, a Democrat from Florida. This amount would only cover the inflation rate of the figure for FY 1986. The vote was 239 to 176. President Reagan had asked for $5.4 billion. There was no amendment on the Hofl House floor for the President's figure. The closest was $5.1 billion, sponsored by arch conservative Robert Dornan of Los Angeles. That was defeated 324 to 94, with even a majority of Republicans voting against it. The Senate has approved a figure of $3.9 billion, but it missed cutting the SDI budget to the House figure by only one vote. The defense bill now goes to a conference committee, where it is expected the final figure will be $3.5 billlion. It is clear from these votes that the SDI's support is wavering in Congress. The imminence of the cuts prompted a series of alarms from conservatives, in- cluding one yesterday from Jack Kemp and Malcolm Wallop (Senator from Wyoming) in the New York Times. Kemp and Wallop brought to the New York Times the panic that has been expressed in more conservative journals for the last month or so-- that the SDI is "being researched to death." A new phrase of contempt has appeared among SDI supporters: "research forever, deploy never." M. Stanton Evans, a right-wing columnist for Human Events, said that the Congress and the Reagan State Department are turning the SDI into "a very expensive science project." Robert Jastrow has been yelling his head off that the Reagan State Department, in its affection for the arms control process, is condemning the SDI to a state of permanent limbo. Jastrow has been telling everyone who will listen that the recent announcement of the new negotiating policy in which the US will adhere to the ABM Treaty until 1993, in exchange for deep Soviet cuts in offensive missiles, is the "death knell" for the SDI. Strangely enough, Jastrow has been claiming that the Department of Defense is prohibited by law from pursuing weapons programs which, when they come to fruition, would violate an existing arms control treaty (this to me sounds like hogwash anyway). Even more strangely, the conservative supporters of the SDI have started to ignore the strongest opponents of the program and have started to direct their attention to an even bigger bogeyman, the Reagan State Department. Kemp, Congressman Jim Courter of New Jersey (now the leading House supporter of the SDI), Wallop (long the leading Senate supporter) and Jastrow, among others, are claiming that the biggest enemy of the SDI is George Shultz. The supporters contend that the Reagan State Department is too attached to arms control, and they have bullied the President into accepting the desirability of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits most of the research required by the SDI. These supporters also contend that there are "off the shelf" technologies available to deploy parts of a strategic defense right now, and that to wait until 1993 to deploy a system will give the Soviets a seven-year head start. These SDI supporters want the US to notify the Soviet Union that we will abandon the ABM Treaty in six months, as the Treaty requires. President Reagan, after having listened to Shultz and sent off a delegation to Moscow to negotiate on strategic arms, is now being blindsided by Republicans to the right of him. The SDIO, for its part, has made a lot of groaning noises about the proposed cuts in funding, but some insiders claim that they can do everything they want with only $3.1 billion, and that they are so awash with money from previous years that they are funding a lot of highly questionable projects which can be easily abandoned. Not surprisingly, however, with such sums at stake there are fights developing about which technologies will be given priority. Edward Teller is still fighting for the life of the x-ray laser, which is not only threatened by budget cuts, but is now jeopardized by a recent announcement that the US and the Soviet Union will finally be talking about a comprehensive test ban (and both the Senate and the House voted for non-binding resolutions calling for such talks). Jastrow, Kemp, Courter, et.al., are pushing for near-term technologies for point defense; the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to direct the SDIO to put more effort into silo defenses and less into space-based area defenses. The President still clings vaguely to population defense, but even he seems to have lost interest in the debate over the SDI. Supporters in Congress are somewhat peeved that the President did not use the leverage on Congress for the SDI that he used in the contra aid vote, for example. The President's latest negotiating position, however, is clever enough to actually *bind* the US to deploying a strategic defense after 1993, as part of a treaty with the Soviets. It is unlikely that this will come to pass, however. It is highly doubtful that the Soviets and the United States will be able to work out their differences over strategic defense and space-based weapons in the two years remaining in the Reagan Administration, let alone have the Senate ratify an arms control treaty, especially with the powerful forces in the right wing of the Republican Party (and within the Administration) which are opposed to *any* treaty with the Soviets. So the SDI is likely to remain "an expensive science project" for the years remaining of the Reagan Presidency. And it is almost impossible to tell what the future of the program will be under a different President. Democrats are increasingly attracted to silo defense--this has become the position of Sam Nunn who is probably the most influential Democrat on strategic weapons issues. Moderate Republicans have been curiously silent on the SDI, while of course the Presidential hopeful Jack Kemp would abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy what he could as soon as possible. But any President will be subject to the growing skepticism of Congress and the increasing pressures of the Federal deficit and the expense of other military programs. It could be that the SDI will indeed be "researched to death," soaking up $ 3 billion plus increases for inflation year after year, until those levels of funding become our institutionalized cost for ballistic missile defense research, as the $1 billion level was before March, 1983. Then military officers will gradually realize that an assignment to BMD work is the end of their career, and the press will snore every time anyone brings up "Star Wars." The SDI ends not with a bang, but a whimper. . . ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************