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From: dbs@edison.UUCP (Donald Stock)
Newsgroups: net.aviation,net.columbia,net.misc,net.sci
Subject: Re: When "Can-Do" Becomes "Can't Fail".
Message-ID: <841@edison.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 15-Aug-86 15:40:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: edison.841
Posted: Fri Aug 15 15:40:40 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 17-Aug-86 09:11:58 EDT
References: <1210@loral.UUCP>
Organization: General Electric Company, Charlottesville, VA
Lines: 19
Xref: watmath net.aviation:3425 net.columbia:3011 net.misc:9997 net.sci:1515

Regarding the Shuttle catastrophe:

> Senator John Glenn  went  further.   The  can-do  spirit,  he  noted,  worked
> perfectly well in the old days, when it included  a  powerful  commitment  to
> safety.  In Glenn's view, "can do" gave away over the years to  "an  arrogant
> `can't fail' attitude".  Managers assumed that  no  matter  what  risks  they
> took, the shuttle would succeed.

I agree with the theme.   What  should  happen  is  that  the  designers  think
positive while the testers think negative AND the testers have the authority to
prevent release of whatever it is that's being  developed.   What  happened  to
NASA was basically as simple as testers (perhaps it would be more  accurate  to
say their managers) thinking positive ("Well, so what if it failed  this  test?
It'll work anyway!).  What made it worse was that  the  chains  of  command  of
designers and testers met at far too low a level (i.e.  not at the top).   Good
ol' Larry Mulloy (head of NASA's solid booster division) should never have been
able to intercept the test results.  But he did.

Don Stock