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From: Margulies@SAPSUCKER.SCRC.SYMBOLICS.COM (Benson I. Margulies)
Newsgroups: mod.protocols.tcp-ip
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Message-ID: <860929075908.8.MARGULIES@REDWING.SCRC.Symbolics.COM>
Date: Mon, 29-Sep-86 07:59:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: REDWING.860929075908.8.MARGULIES
Posted: Mon Sep 29 07:59:00 1986
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    Date: Fri, 26 Sep 86 09:13:04 -0500
    From: mckee@mitre.ARPA

    Marshall Abrams, a Security guru here at MITRE, sent me a copy of the
    following note by Brian Reid.  The note has little to do with TCP and
    IP, but it is instructive to learn how our networks are being used for
    nefarious purposes, and besides, there is a certain lascivious pleasure
    in reading about somebody elses troubles.  H. C. McKee
    --------------------------

    From: reid@decwrl.DEC.COM (Brian Reid)
    Date: 16 Sep 1986 1519-PDT (Tuesday)
    To: Peter G. Neumann <Neumann@csl.sri.com>   [FOR RISKS]
    Subject: Massive UNIX breakins at Stanford

	Lessons learned from a recent rash of Unix computer breakins

   ...


    Brian Reid
    DEC Western Research and Stanford University


As an Ex-B2 security hacker (guess where), I just wanted to point out
that Brian's observations are basically right-on.  There is a big
tension between wanting to be able to run an application without having
the user have to type passwords and having fail-safe network security.
The bottom line is that if you treat an entire network of machines as
one "System" in the orange book sense (no passwords used in between),
then you had better be bloody sure that you have working software on all
of them, and that you monitor activities closely.

caveat manager