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From: drew@ukma.uky.csnet (Andrew Lawson)
Newsgroups: net.ai,net.cog-eng
Subject: Re: Searle, Turing, Symbols, Categories (Question not comment)
Message-ID: <4865@ukmf.ukma.uky.csnet>
Date: Thu, 9-Oct-86 11:23:35 EDT
Article-I.D.: ukmf.4865
Posted: Thu Oct  9 11:23:35 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 10-Oct-86 08:29:31 EDT
References: <158@mind.UUCP> <150@cwrudg.UUCP> <160@mind.UUCP>
Reply-To: drew@ukmf.UUCP (Andrew Lawson)
Organization: U of Kentucky, Mathematical Sciences
Lines: 20
Keywords: Robotics, Symbol-Crunching, Category Representation,Analog Representation, Induction
Xref: mnetor net.ai:1181 net.cog-eng:280

In article <160@mind.UUCP> harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) writes:
>
>On my argument the distinction between the two versions is critical,
>because the linguistic version can (in principle) be accomplished by
>nothing but symbols-in/symbols-out (and symbols in between) whereas
>the robotic version necessarily calls for non-symbolic processes
>(transducer, effector, analog and A/D).

This is not clear.  When I look at my surroundings, you are no
more than a symbol (just as is anything outside of my being).
Remember that "symbol" is not rigidly defined most of the time.
  When I recognize the symbol of a car heading toward me, I respond
by moving out of the way.  This is not essentially different from
a linguistic system recognizing a symbol and responding with another
symbol.

-- 
Drew Lawson                             cbosgd!ukma!drew
"Parts is parts."			drew@uky.csnet
					drew@UKMA.BITNET