Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!caip!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!petrus!sabre!zeta!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxv!nvuxj!nvuxg!sinragp From: sinragp@nvuxg.UUCP (R. P. SINGH) Newsgroups: soc.culture.indian Subject: India Now Part 5 Message-ID: <308@nvuxg.UUCP> Date: Thu, 18-Sep-86 09:59:15 EDT Article-I.D.: nvuxg.308 Posted: Thu Sep 18 09:59:15 1986 Date-Received: Tue, 23-Sep-86 01:45:38 EDT Organization: BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH Lines: 567 From uucp Thu Sep 18 06:53 EDT 1986 >From balaji%bacall.uucp@usc-cse.usc.edu Thu Sep 18 05:43:53 1986 remote from bellcore Received: by usc-cse.usc.edu via UUCP (4.12/S2.6) id AA21222; Wed, 17 Sep 86 10:28:25 pdt Date: Wed, 17 Sep 86 10:28:25 pdt Message-Id: <8609171728.AA21222@usc-cse.usc.edu> To: sinragp%nvuxg.uucp%bellcore.arpa@usc-cse.usc.edu To: sinragp%nvuxg.uucp%bellcore.arpa@usc-cse.usc.edu Subject: India Now - part 3 INDIA NOW September 1986 Part 3 of 5 News and Views from Indian newspapers and magazines Contents: Part 1: Introduction Shiv Sena Blamed for Nasik Communal Riots Parliament Debates Communal Riots Procession as Incitement Gastro-Enteritis in Ahmedabad Book Reviews - Eight Lives: A study of Hindu-Muslim Encounter by Rajmohan Gandhi - Indian Muslims: A Study of the Minority Problems in India by Asghar Ali Engineer Part 2: Behind the Killings: State of Democratic Rights in Patna, Gaya, Singhbhum Stop It Now! Attacks on Women A Pilgrimage to Punjab Part 3: One Year Later, Punjab Accord is Faltering Zail Singh's Problems Part 4: Ahmedabad Divided Ranchi Mental Asylum Punjab Grain Production Up Dowry Prohibition Bill Injectible Contraceptives Opposed Children in Jails Sanctions Against South Africa Nayar on Security Threats Action Against Union Leader Stayed Krishna Iyer Calls for Terrorist Act Repeal Inquiry Commission Bill Bill of Security Belt Hutment Demolition in Madras National Anthem Controversy Part 5: Arwal Massacre and Government Coverup Laldenga to head the coalition govt. in Mizoram Riots in Ahmedabad: Excerpts from Press Indian Writers walk out of Commonwealth writers conference A new watch by Congress High Command Hindu and Sikh amity quite prevalent in Punjab Indefinite Detention Without Trial Possible Floods kill over Hundreds of people Central policing of Border Areas planned Bill to withhold inquiry commission reports enacted Farooq forsees worst J&K Crisis Assam accord not being implemented Rajiv's new Kitchen cabinet Parliament asks for global sanctions Bombay Our City Chosen Best Non-feature Film Over 45,000 Arrested in Bihar Gold Medal for Debshishu ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: Introduction Dear Friends: In the past the response to News Bulletins from Deepak Kapur has been overwhelmingly positive. This has encouraged us to produce an expanded version of the bulletin, in the current form of a news digest. We hope you will continue to find this voluntary news service interesting and informative. The material is being assembled as a joint effort by a number of us. Editing is by Sekhar Ramakrishnan at Columbia University, New York. Please let us know if you have any suggestions. You can send mail to Sekhar at RBDMG@CUVMB.BITNET, to KAPUR@GE-CRD.ARPA, to balaji@usc-cse, to MKS@SUNY-SBCS.CSNET, or to JAY@CADRE.ARPA. Due to the considerable amount of material, each issue of India Now will be in 2-5 parts. If you would like a hard copy version on a regular basis, please write to India Now, P.O.Box 37, Westmount, Quebec H3Z 2P1, Canada. There is a cost of roughly $1.50 per issue to cover xeroxing and mailing. The news digest is in a format suitable for use with the rn command for skipping individual items in the digest [ctrl-G]. You are reading part 3 of the 5 parts of the issue dated September 1986. ------------------------------ Subject: One Year Later, Punjab Accord Is Faltering A.G. Noorani A year after it was concluded, the Punjab accord survives only as a cripple hovering between life and death. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of ascertaining how it came to be maimed and who is responsible for maiming it. The accord was universally hailed in the country. It was not meant to be a final solution of the Punjab question. But it clearly charted the steps towards that goal. Those steps were approved because they marked a U-turn from the gory path of confrontation. Internationally, India's prestige soared. Its political system was lauded for its ability to resolve such a problem. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was deservedly praised for his courage in making the U-turn. No single act of his since he became prime minister received greater praise. He staked his prestige on the success of the accord by affixing his own signature to it. Today, the country is baffled that the bloodshed continues unabated. A systematic attempt is being made to squeeze out the Hindu population from the border districts. The chief minister of Punjab, Surjit Singh Barnala, is confronted with the terrorists who are behind this sordid attempt, with dissident Akalis who seek his office and with dark hints by some at the Center that "he has been wanting" in the qualities of leadership. The prime minister's prestige and credibility have suffered precisely in the measure they would have risen if the accord had worked out. And worked out, it can still be. It was maimed only as a result of crude attempts to bend it to suit partisan ends. It can be restored by an honest resolve to respect its structure. Simply, by following its terms. The accord's 11 clauses varied in importance. Some merely exhorted virtue - "protection of interests of minorities." Some others embodied the Center's assurances of conciliatory measures - "rehabilitate and provide gainful employment" to those discharged from the army. One does not hear much about these matters. Not even about the Misra Commission inquiring into the November 1984 riots in Delhi, Bokaro and Kanpur. Do not be surprised at protests when a summary of its conclusions is published. It has worked in secret. Its terms of reference deliberately omit the causes of the riots and allegations of culpability. On April 8, 1986, the Citizens' Justice Commission, headed by a former chief justice of India, S.M.Sikri, withdrew from participation in the commission's proceedings. Its grievances are well-founded enough to affect the commission's credibility. One hears a lot about the dispute concerning the sharing of the waters of the Ravi-Beas system. The accord stipulated two things. The rival claims of Punjab and Haryana will be referred to a tribunal presided over by a Supreme Court judge. "The decision of this tribunal will be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties." The steps required to set up the tribunal would be "taken expeditiously." The accord was signed on July 24, 1985. The government of India set up the tribunal, headed by Justice Balkrishna Eradi, very "expeditiously" indeed. Exactly six months later, on January 25, 1986. That was only when a huge blow had been inflicted on the accord. A deadlock had been reached on the promised transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab on Republic Day 1986. The promise was broken. It was the section on "territorial claims" spelt out in four subparas of Para 7 of the accord which constituted its heart. It touched the sensitive issues which had foiled repeated attempts for a settlement. But the sole territorial issue was not Chandigarh. It was the small but economically profitable Fazilka-Abohar area. Mrs Indira Gandhi doggedly refused to accept Punjab's just claims to Chandigarh unless it agreed to give this area to Haryana. So determined was she that her famous award of January 29, 1970, mapped out a corridor "in order to provide contiguity" between this area and Haryana. In her broadcast on June 2, 1984, on the eve of Operation Bluestar, she offered reference of "the whole territorial dispute including Chandigarh and Abohar-Fazilka to a commission." The Akali demand as set out in her White Paper was the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and reference of "all other claims and counterclaims, including those on Abohar-Fazilka, to a commission." But with a major condition which is extremely relevant today. The commission would decide "on the basis of the village as the unit and language and contiguity as the principle" - the triple criteria. This would have ruled out Haryana getting Fazilka and Abohar altogether. It was admittedly not contiguous to this area. Hence, the corridor. Mrs Gandhi rejected the triple criteria. Rajiv Gandhi accepted it in the Punjab accord. It is falling apart today because its vital provision - the triple criteria - has been abandoned openly by the government. This is the nub of the matter. Let us see how it has come about. The accord says in Para 7.1 that Chandigarh will go to Punjab. Adjoining areas added to it from the Punjabi and Hindi regions of the former undivided state of Punjab will be asssigned to the respective states. This spells for Punjab loss of parts of the Golf Club and the railway station area, about two dozen tubewells which supply drinking water to the city and local police lines. This dispute centers on the other provisions, Para 7.2 and 7.4. Para 7.2 reads thus: "It had always been maintained by Smt Indira Gandhi that when Chandigarh is to go to Punjab, some Hindi-speaking territories in Punjab will go to Haryana. A commission will be constituted to determine the specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana, in lieu of Chandigarh." "The principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit will be the basis of such determination. The commission will be required to give its findings by 31st December, 1985, and these will be binding on both sides. The work of the commission will be limited to this aspect and will be distinct from the general boundary claims which the other commission referred to in Para 7.4 will handle." "There are other claims and counterclaims for readjustment of the existing Punjab-Haryana boundaries. The government will appoint another commission to consider these matters and give its findings. Such findings will be binding on the concerned states. The terms of reference will be based on village as a unit, linguistic affinity and contiguity." In between, Para 7.3 says that "actual transfer" of Chandigarh and "areas in lieu" of it to Haryana will take place "simultaneously" on January 26, 1986. The accord explicitly accepts the triple criteria in all respects, unlike the previous offers to the Akalis. Its departures from the 1970 award are all the more striking for the similarities in drafting. The award assigned Chandigarh to Punjab and Fazilka-Abohar to Haryana straightaway. Next, it engisaged a single commission, "for readjustment of the existing interstate boundaries." However, Chandigarh's transfer was not linked with the recommendations of this commission. Only the transfer of the Fazilka area was to be made "simultaneously" with the transfer of the areas recommended by the commission. In her broadcast of June 2, 1984, Mrs Gandhi wanted Haryana to "get its share of some Hindi-speaking areas." She characterized these as "the transfer of areas to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh." In contrast the accord provides for two commissions. The commission under Para 7.2 would demarcate "the specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh." The commission under para 7.4 will consider "other claims and counterclaims for readjustment" of the boundaries of the two states. The "specific" one (7.2) was to consider Haryana's claim alone. It had a deadline - December 31, 1985. The general one, which is yet to be set up, is to consider the claims of both at leisure. No deadline is set. This is because the specific Hindi-speaking areas to go to Haryana "in lieu" of Chandigarh have to be transferred "simultaneously" with the city. Whereas the Punjabi-speaking areas in Haryana and other Hindi-speaking areas in Punjab would be exchanged later. In the commission dealing with the "specific areas," Haryana alone is the claimant. In the other, both are claimants. That is the only difference. The triple criteria govern both commissions in the clearest terms. Therefore, an area which can well go to Haryana after the general inquiry (7.4) can also be the subject of an earlier transfer as a specific area "in lieu" of Chandigarh (7.2). Note there was no reference to compensation or the adequacy of the areas. The triple criteria alone mattered. The terms of the accord differed from Mrs Gandhi's offers as much as the policy of conciliation it expressed differs from her policy of confrontation. After the accord came disingenuous moves to approximate the terms of the accord to her offers while professedly maintaining the policy of conciliation. Those moves have been at total variance with the policy. The stray phrases were invoked. One was the reference to Mrs Gandhi's intention in Para 7.2 despite the fact that it ran totally counter to the triple criteria accepted in the para itself. The other was the expression "in lieu of Chandigarh." It was used to mean "compensation" and to confer on the commission power to decide on the adequacy of the area. The result in either case is the same - jettisoning of the triple criteria. Prakash Singh Badal revealed (January 16, 1986) that the late Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, who had signed the accord with the prime minister, had told him and other Akali leaders that he had been given an "unwritten understanding" that the Fazilka areas would not be touched. It was on this basis that the Akalis had ratified the accord at Anandpur Sahib. It rings true. On any fair interpretation of the accord, these areas are out of Haryana's reach. However, when Justice K.K.Mathew was appointed to the Commission of Inquiry, on August 20, 1985, under Article 7.2 for the specific areas, the terms of reference came as a rude surprise. The triple criteria were coupled with a virtual carte blanche to ignore it "and may also take into consideration such other factors as it may deem relevant or appropriate." Rajiv Gandhi said, on October 11, 1985, that it was an "unintentional and unfortunate" error in drafting. It would be difficult to chagne the terms of reference since the commission had already begun its work. The plea was manifestly unconvincing. The terms of refernce of the Madon Commission on the Bhiwandi riots of May 1970 were altered after it had begun its work. The prime minister's assurance that no Congress-I government would take advantage of the error implied assumption of responsibility for controlling Bhajan Lal's conduct before the commission. The prime minister's stand was most unfortunate. The accord had by then been sealed with the blood of Longowal. He was assassinated on August 20. It had also received the people's mandate in the Punjab elections on September 25. With a judge who had adopted controversial positions on the L.N.Mishra Commission, on the Second Press Commission, and on the Law Commission was recalled for this task remains a mystery. So does the Union government's willingness to go along with his disastrous "enumeration" and, what is often forgotten, his interpretation of the Mrs Gandhi clause of Para 7.2 of the accord - "it had always been maintained by Mrs Indira Gandhi that when Chandigarh is to go to Punjab, some Hindi-speaking territories in Punjab will go to Haryana." The intent underlying the accord was plain. When Mathew misconstrued it, it was the clear duty of the Union to tell him so. It should have stood by the meaning on the basis of which Longowal signed the accord. It did not. Haryana claimed nothing but the Fazilka-Abohar areas before Mathew. He, in turn, considered nothing else. Punjab's offer of 13 villages in Rajpura tehsil to Haryana was "rejected outright by the state of Haryana and therefore the commission was not called upon to examine the same." Pray, why not? The commission interpreted Para 7.2 of the accord - the specific areas - in the light of Mrs Gandhi's award of 1970 as expressing her intent. It next ordered an enumeration of 54 villages of the Fazilka and Muktsar tehsils. It discovered what everyone knew. What had been reported by correspondents who had made detailed investigations. What he himself ought to have perceived in the light of Mrs Gandhi's famous corridor - that the areas were not contiguous to Haryana "with village Kandu Khera breaking the contiguity." Belatedly, he opined that "although the particular intention of Mrs Gandhi regarding the areas has not been fulfilled, 'the general intention' of transferring some Hindi-speaking territory... is still there." Have another commission to define those areas, he recommended after his irresponsible performance. The deadline extended to Republic Day was not met. Thanks to the Center's failure to stand by the accord before the commission. The atmosphere had been fouled by the enumeration which was a virtual plebiscite on communal lines. And by Bhajan Lal's rhetoric. At the Congress centenary celebrations, while other speakers were given hardly ten minutes' time, Bhajan Lal was actually allowed to declaim Haryana's case for 30 minutes in the presence of the Center's leaders. Barnala had ably tackled the traffic blockade proclaimed by the AISSF on January 10. He had secured a mandate from his party to deal with it firmly. But already by October 1985, terrorism had reared its head again. A trap was carefully laid for the capture of the Golden Temple - the Kar Seva for the reconstruction of the Akal Takht. The SGPC president, no foe of extremists, announced plans for a Kar Seva from January 27; Bhindranwale's Damdami Taksal, backed by the AISSF, for January 26 - the day Chandigarh was to have been transferred. Tohra accepted this date. On the pretext of a Kar Seva, the extremists captured the Temple. It is perverse to suggest that the rise in terrorism had nothing to do with the failure to implement the accord. One correspondent reported that "Union home ministry officials confirm that there was a lull in extremist activity between Longowal's assassination in August last year and January 26, the deadline set for the implementation of the Punjab accord. It was only after the deadline had been given the go-by that there was a sharp upswing in terrorist activity." On April 5, another commission was appointed consisting of Justice E.S.Venkataramaiah of the Supreme Court. On June 19, 1984, he had to try two habeas corpus petitions in the wake of Operation Blue Star. He referred them to a larger bench. But only after delivering himself of political observations. He had a simple task to perform. "To take into account" the Mathew Report and "determine and specify the other Hindi-speaking areas," i.e., other than the Fazilka-Abohar areas. He was mandated to follow the triple criteria - village as unit, language and contiguity. Not adequacy. The very first issue he posed departed basically from the accord: "What should be the reasonable extent of land that should be transferred from Punjab to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh?" He goes on to talk of "a just equivalent" to Chandigarh and says an "area of 70,000 acres should be transferred." He fixes the size first and next suggests "another commission to find out those Hindi-speaking villages whose total area is about 70,000 acres." He ignored his clear mandate to "determine and specify" the areas that satisfied the triple criteria. The judge "picked out" 30 villages covering 45,000 acres which met the criteria but characterized them as "inadequate." The adequacy of the areas was not a matter for the commission to opine. But he repeatedly talks of what Haryana would have got if it had been given Fazilka and Abohar and tries to award land "in lieu" of these areas, rather than Chandigarh. Unprecedentedly but significantly, both reports have been suppressed. Only extracts have been published. When the report was submitted on June 12, the Akalis had already split. After the proclamation of Khalistan on April 29, Barnala approved of the commando action the next day which flushed out the extremists from the Golden Temple. Some of his cabinet colleagues led by Amrinder Singh resigned and joined hands with Tohra, Badal & Co. The split was formalized on July 5 with the election of Badal as leader. Yet, Barnala accepted the figure of 70,000 acres. He only suggested that the transfer of Chandigarh fixed for July 15 be linked to that of the 45,000 acres already identified. The rest could be left to the "general" boundary commission. Now, Home Minister Buta Singh did the incredible. On June 18 he wrote to Barnala saying that his offer of 45,000 acres "is clearly inconsistent with Para 7.2 of the accord." Why? Because "the majority of these villages offered will obviously have to be considered by the commission to be stipulated under para 7.4." The work of a commission set up under Para 7.2 "will be limited to this aspect (compensation to Haryana for Chandigarh) which will be distinct from the general boundary claims for the other commission referred to in Para 7.4." Never before had the Center taken this position. At least not openly. Since both commissions are bound by the triple criteria, Buta Singh implied clearly that he was abandoning it for the commission to be set up under Para 7.2. He invoked the compensation theory and discarded the triple criteria although it is clearly set out in Para 7.2. The two judges had been asked explicitly to follow the criteria. But Buta Singh now argued that "these 30 villages cannot be considered as constituting territory in lieu of Chandigarh" although they met the criteria. Evidently, only territory which is not contiguous or is Punjabi-speaking - only territory which does not fulfil the triple criteria - can be awarded as compensation. Else, it can go to Haryana under Para 7.4 as part of a boundary settlement. Justice Venkataramaiah had asked the parties to arrive at another accord "without insisting on proof regarding the question whether they are Hindi-speaking or Punjabi-speaking." Buta Singh is imposing just that on Punjab. Accordingly, Justice D.A.Desai was asked on June 20 to specify the 70,000 acres for transfer to Haryana without any criteria whatever to guide him. He was asked to report within hours "not later than the forenoon of June 21, 1986." This was the deadline for the transfer of Chandigarh fixed on May 31. On June 21, the terms were modified. Desai "should keep in view" the triple criteria and "consider the 30 villages measuring about 45,000 acres identified" by Justice Venkataramaiah. The deadline was extended to July 15. A vital binding provision of the accord, the very basis of Akali acceptance, the triple criteria, was abandoned. Buta Singh's theory was woven into the amended terms - "provided they (the 45,000 acres) fall within the purview of Para 7.2 of the accord." But then, if they did not, why did Justice Venkataramaiah, appointed only under Para 7.2, identify them at all? As far back as February 10, the prime minister had hinted that the terms of reference of the commission would be altered. Those of the Mathew Commission were done in a hurry and were defective, he said. The terms (read, the accord) have now been unilaterally modified. The mess in Punjab has not resulted because the accord was followed but because it was repeatedly violated by New Delhi. It is pointless to consider the rival charges of bad faith in respect of the Desai Commission. Barnala wrote to the prime minister on June 20 asking for the transfer of Chandigarh and the identified 45,000 acres the next day and suggesting the appointment of the commission under para 7.4. One June 23, significantly two days after Punjab rejected the Desai Commission, the prime minister asked Barnala to give priority attention to the law and order situation. Three days later Arjun Singh hinted at President's rule and Kamalapati Tripathi delivered a month's ultimatum. Rajiv Gandhi's fulsume tribute to Barnala on July 2 could not have been due to any substantial progress in curbing terrorism since June 23. It is pathetic to see failure keep one deadline (January 26) after another (June 21) with uncertainties bedeviling the third (July 15) as well. The Center's policy on the transfer of Chandigarh has been a shoddy one. It has all but abandoned the Punjab accord on this aspect. Not that Barnala is blameless. He was pledged to complete the construction of the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal by August 15. The pledge has been violated. Nor has he exerted himself to infuse confidence in the Hindus of Punjab. He has fostered the image of a panthic rather than a Punjabi government. He knew that some of his colleagues were in league with terrorists but took no action against them. He has been woefully weak in providing leadership for stamping out terrorism. Rajiv Gandhi deserves by far the greater blame. He knew what the accord meant and implied. He saw it being twisted and distorted. He did nothing to set matters right. Buta Singh surely spoke on his behalf. The prime minister's credibility has suffered in consequence. It can be repaired. But only by the fullest implementation of the Punjab accord. ------------------------------ Subject: Zail Singh's Problems The President's customary broadcast to the nation on the eve of Independence Day came in for some last minute change on August 14 when the Prime Minister's Secretariat reportedly objected to one paragraph in his speech. It is learnt that Zail Singh had even completed his recording for All-India Radio and Doordarshan when the request for deletion of these remarks came from P.V.Narasimha Rao and Buta Singh. The deleted paragraph reads as follows: "A government gets the support of the people by its handling of issues with a liberal but firm approach. Consideration for the sentiments of the people earns their affection and goodwill. It is most essential for the government to protect the life, property and honor of every citizen. Any government that is unable to discharge these obligations will lose its credibility." Earlier, during the debate in Parliament on the suppression of the report of the Thakkar Commission, which inquired into Indira Gandhi's assassination, it was suggested by some opposition members that the report had not been shown to Zail Singh. ------------------------------ End of INDIA NOW news digest ****************************