Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!lll-crg!lll-lcc!unisoft!dual!ptsfa!qantel!ihnp4!cbatt!cbdkc1!pmd From: pmd@cbdkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) Newsgroups: talk.abortion Subject: Re: It's still mine Message-ID: <1588@cbdkc1.UUCP> Date: Wed, 24-Sep-86 16:28:45 EDT Article-I.D.: cbdkc1.1588 Posted: Wed Sep 24 16:28:45 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 29-Sep-86 01:41:29 EDT References: <5152@decwrl.DEC.COM> <1091@ogcvax.UUCP> <631@houem.UUCP> Reply-To: pmd@dkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus Lines: 51 In article <631@houem.UUCP> marty1@houem.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) writes: > >There is a "vast" difference between a fetus and a two-year-old. One >is a person and the other is not, and the semantics of the distinction >is not "drivel." The state, in the exercise of its police powers, can >protect a two-year-old without imposing on the pursuit of happiness >of any other person. It depends on how you define "persuit of happiness" doesn't it? From whose point of view is the "persuit of happiness" taken? The state can protect me from someone who wants to take my life. From the perspective of the one who wants to kill me, doing so may facilitate his persuit of happiness. Of course, we don't consider his perspective because we consider his act to be wrong. Why is it different for the pregnant woman? Why do you apparently give her the blank check of "persuit of happiness", subordinating the life of the fetus to whatever reason she fills in? >For example, a two-year-old can become a foster >child. It can not so protect a fetus. It can not remove a fetus from >the body of its natural mother and place it in the body of a foster >mother. If it could, abortion would be possible without killing the >fetus, and the whole argument about abortion would be different. The state can and has protected the fetus, with laws restricting abortion. Why do you assume that protective measures are only possible if a person is portable? You also seem to imply that portibility makes one a person because the state *may* protect one in that case. But even that is no reason why it *should*. Which brings us to your next point: >The state has eminent domain over real estate, but not over persons. >It has no right to put a sign on a woman's belly saying "this property >is needed for public use." The stage at which a living human thing >becomes a person is precisely the stage at which the state can protect >it as an individual without demanding the participation of some other >unwilling individual. How is whether or not you are a person dependent on what the state *can* do? Where is the connection between *can* and *should*? You can only make that connection if you consider humans for what they *are* as being rightful human beings. If their right to life depends on where they are or their "portability", no such connection exists. If humans merit protection because they are humans, then there is not a "vast" difference between a fetus and a 2-year-old. Not so long ago in our history, some persons were "ruled" to be real estate. (Dred Scott). The state *could* have protected them too. Your logic reveals no reason why it should. -- Paul Dubuc cbdkc1!pmd