Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!lll-crg!lll-lcc!qantel!ihnp4!cbatt!cbdkc1!pmd From: pmd@cbdkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) Newsgroups: talk.abortion Subject: Re: It's still mine Message-ID: <1597@cbdkc1.UUCP> Date: Fri, 26-Sep-86 10:29:16 EDT Article-I.D.: cbdkc1.1597 Posted: Fri Sep 26 10:29:16 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 29-Sep-86 02:48:16 EDT References: <5152@decwrl.DEC.COM> <1091@ogcvax.UUCP> <631@houem.UUCP> Reply-To: pmd@dkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus Lines: 80 This article is a revised version of an article I posted two days ago, but cancelled yesterday. I apologize for any confusion this may cause. In article <631@houem.UUCP> marty1@houem.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) writes: > >There is a "vast" difference between a fetus and a two-year-old. One >is a person and the other is not, and the semantics of the distinction >is not "drivel." The state, in the exercise of its police powers, can >protect a two-year-old without imposing on the pursuit of happiness >of any other person. It depends on how you define "pursuit of happiness" doesn't it? From whose point of view is the "pursuit of happiness" taken? The state can protect me from someone who wants to take my life. From the perspective of the one who wants to kill me, doing so may facilitate his pursuit of happiness. Of course, we don't consider his perspective because we consider his act to be wrong. Why is it different for the pregnant woman? Why do you apparently give her the blank check of "pursuit of happiness", subordinating the life of the fetus to whatever reason she fills in? >For example, a two-year-old can become a foster >child. It can not so protect a fetus. It can not remove a fetus from >the body of its natural mother and place it in the body of a foster >mother. If it could, abortion would be possible without killing the >fetus, and the whole argument about abortion would be different. The state can, and has, protected the fetus with laws restricting abortion. Why do you assume that protective measures are only possible if a person is portable? Of course the protection is done by different means but that says nothing about why protection is warranted in one case and not the other. If you are concerned with the effectiveness of each method, well, *both* have limits in that regard. A parent may inflict injury on a 2-year-old without physically hurting self. In that case putting the child out of reach is the deterrent. Although we cannot do this with the fetus, there is still a deterrent in that it is harder for the mother to hurt the fetus without also hurting herself. You simply advocate facilitating abortion on demand as the removal of that deterrent. This presupposes that the deterrent should be removed. You evidently think that the state should *provide* a deterrent in the 2-year-old's case. But for what reason? The fact that it *can* is not necessarily a reason. You seem to imply that portability makes one a person because the state *may* protect one in that case. Aside from the fact that this is a false restriction (as I pointed out above), it is still not a reason why it *should*. Which brings us to your next point: >The state has eminent domain over real estate, but not over persons. >It has no right to put a sign on a woman's belly saying "this property >is needed for public use." The stage at which a living human thing >becomes a person is precisely the stage at which the state can protect >it as an individual without demanding the participation of some other >unwilling individual. What if the state is unwilling? Why should it be willing? You exempt individuals from having to support individuals (even temporarily) who depend competely on them for survival. But how do you justify saddling the state with this responsibility? How is whether or not you are a person dependent on what the state *can* do? Where is the connection between *can* and *should*? You can only make that connection if you consider humans for what they *are* as being rightful human beings. If their right to life depends on *where* they are or their "portability", no such connection exists. We need to talk about whether a life *should* be protected before we get to the question of if, or how well, the state *can* protect anyone. If humans merit protection because they are humans (and I think this is the basis on which most people claim their right to live; not because they are portable), then there is not a "vast" difference between a fetus and a 2-year-old. Not so long ago in our history, some persons were "ruled" to be real estate. (Dred Scott). The state *could* have protected them too. Your logic reveals no reason why it should have. -- Paul Dubuc cbdkc1!pmd