Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!yale!husc6!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!bunker!garys From: garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) Newsgroups: talk.abortion Subject: Re: It's still mine Message-ID: <1233@bunker.UUCP> Date: Tue, 7-Oct-86 09:57:38 EDT Article-I.D.: bunker.1233 Posted: Tue Oct 7 09:57:38 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 11-Oct-86 10:45:22 EDT References: <5152@decwrl.DEC.COM> <1091@ogcvax.UUCP> <631@houem.UUCP> <1200@bunker.UUCP> <637@houem.UUCP> Reply-To: garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) Organization: Bunker Ramo, Trumbull Ct Lines: 109 In article <637@houem.UUCP> marty1@houem.UUCP writes: >In <1200@bunker.UUCP>, garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) comments >on an article I posted: >>In article <631@houem.UUCP> marty1@houem.UUCP writes: >>>The state, in the exercise of its police powers, can >>>protect a two-year-old without imposing on the pursuit of happiness >>>of any other person. >>Really? How? The state, in the exercise of its police powers, can >>only protect a two-year-old by putting him or her in the custody >>of someone. This imposes on the pursuit of happiness of everyone >>who pays taxes to enable the state to pay the cost of its police powers, >>the cost of the investigation which led to the conclusion that the >>two-year-old needed protection, the cost of finding a foster home, >>the cost of followup (to make sure the child doesn't need protecting >>again), and the cost of paying (some) of the foster family's expenses. >All these are similar to things we willingly pay government to do. Willingly? I don't think I ever willingly paid a tax -- I don't recall ever being asked if I want to pay a tax. Which was precisely my point -- collecting taxes imposes on the pursuit of happiness of everyone who would rather not pay them. Which means that the state cannot protect a two-year-old (or anyone else) without imposing on someone to pay for such protection. >>In some cases, protecting a two-year-old requires taking him away >>from his current family, which may be imposing on their pursuit of >>happiness. >Seldom does the state actually do that, for the reason you cite. "Seldom" is not the same as "never." Thus, protecting a two-year-old sometimes imposes on someone else's pursuit of happiness. >>In the case of a child unable to fend for himself, there are three >>alternatives: 1. Find someone willing to take care of the child. >>2. Find someone to force to take care of the child. 3. Make the >>child attempt to fend for himself anyway. >>Alternative 1 says that the child's right to life is contingent on >>someone else's willingness to honor that right. >>Alternative 2 says that the state *can* force someone to take care >>of another person -- the parents are, in general, the most likely >>candidates. >>Alternative 3 says that there is no real right to life for those >>unable to fend for themselves. >>I see problems with all of these alternatives. Can someone show >>me why the problems are not really problems, or think up alternative >>4? >Alternative 4 is supporting the child in a state-supported >institution. All these are used as and when appropriate, except that >I do not believe alternative 2 is constitutionally valid. Actually, >foster care at state expense (alternative 1) seems to fill in most of >the gaps. Your alternative 4 is the same as my alternative 1 (if taxes are paid willingly) or 2 (if taxes are paid involuntarily). "State expense" hides the fact that the state's only source of income is the citizenry. >Gary has stated the essential problems of the situation. But think of >the alternatives if a fetus is to be protected: alternatives 1 (except >for the natural mother) and 4 do not exist, and I believe alternative 2 >to be unacceptable. But alternative 2 happens all the time. If a child is not given proper, there are several ways in which the state forces someone to take care of it. Collecting taxes to support foster homes is one way. Forcing someone (usually the father) to pay child support is another. Do you object to the enforcement of child support payments, too? >Yes, the right of a *fetus* to life is contingent >on someone else's willingness to honor that right. Ultimately, the >right of any of us to life is contingent on someone else's willingness >to honor that right. I do not understand. First, you emphasize the word fetus, as if to say that only a fetus's right to life is contingent on others, then you go on to say that everyone's right to life is contingent on others. Imagine the following scenario: "The defendant, charged with the murder of a homeless derelict with no known living relatives, challenged the prosecution to find someone who wanted the victim to remain alive. When the prosecution was unable to find anyone who could prove a personal interest in the victim's life, the case was dismissed." If the right to life is contingent on others, what (if anything) is wrong with the above scenario? "Having discovered a truly novel defense to the charge of murder, the defendant then eliminated an entire family whose continued existence interefered with his pursuit of happiness. Actually, only a few members of the family annoyed him, but disposing of the entire family assured that the same defense would again be successful." I don't really think you would say that the above would represent a valid defense, but I see that as the logical conclusion of the statement that a person's right to life is contingent on someone else's willingness to honor that right. Gary Samuelson