Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!husc6!panda!genrad!decvax!bellcore!ulysses!allegra!princeton!rutgers!sri-spam!sri-unix!hplabs!qantel!vixie!dwyer From: dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Dwyer's Response to Templeton on Objectivism (parts 6-8 of 9) Message-ID: <154@vixie.UUCP> Date: Fri, 3-Oct-86 21:37:13 EDT Article-I.D.: vixie.154 Posted: Fri Oct 3 21:37:13 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 11-Oct-86 09:23:50 EDT Reply-To: dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) Distribution: world Organization: Vixie Enterprises, San Mateo, CA Lines: 106 A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism by William Dwyer (parts 6, 7 and 8 of 9) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP, posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or of the original article, are available upon request. Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- "PROBLEM 6: The great circle of Metaphysics and Epistemology." Templeton states: Objectivists feel that metaphysics is the most fundamental of philoso- phies. But since metaphysicians . . . are all human, it's actually a body of knowledge -- the study of the nature of reality. But how a body of knowledge is built is the domain of epistemology. To gain a picture of the nature of reality, you need an epistemology. But to gain an epistemology, you need a brain. And a brain is part of reality, and its existence must follow the rules of metaphysics. So both disciplines require the other, and as such, neither can contain irreduci- ble primaries, just circular ones. To begin with, metaphysics is not a philosophy but a branch of philosophy. Secondly, there is no contradiction between metaphysics being the most funda- mental branch of philosophy (if indeed it is) and a body of knowledge as well. A branch of philosophy IS a body of knowledge. However, contrary to Templeton, Objectivism does not consider metaphysics to be more fundamental than ep- istemology. Templeton is confusing metaphysics, which is the study of the na- ture of existence, with existence itself. Although Objectivism considers ex- istence to be more fundamental than consciousness, it does not consider meta- physics to be more fundamental than epistemology. It is true that a rational epistemology must conform to the laws of reality, if only because the law of identity is ontological, meaning that the law describes reality, not just thought. It is irrational to hold contradictions in one's mind, because they do not exist in reality. However, since metaphysics and ep- istemology are fundamental branches of philosophy, neither can have primacy over the other. In a sense, both are primary, in that neither can be reduced to a branch of philosophy that is more fundamental than the other. Templeton says that "to gain an epistemology, you need a brain. And a brain is part of reality, and its existence must follow the rules of metaphysics. So both disciplines require the other..." Each discipline does require the other, but not in the way that he suggests. You don't arrive at rational principles of epistemology by studying the neuro- logical structure of the human brain, for the knowledge you would gain from that study would be inferential, and the process of inference would itself need to be based on a rational epistemology. Metaphysics is the study of the nature of existence -- of existence as such -- and epistemology, the study of the na- ture of knowledge -- of knowledge as such. These disciplines are necessarily broader and more fundamental than a particular science such as neurology. They therefore cannot be predicated on such a science. "PROBLEM 7: Free will, mysticism and materialism." Templeton argues: To me, saying that all things have a specific nature, and that there is no such thing as the supernatural adds up to materialism. Doesn't materialism imply determinism in the traditional sense? Materialism, in philosophy, is the view that everything is matter in motion, and that there is no mind. Such a view does not follow simply from the fact that all things have a specific nature and are part of the natural world. Consciousness or mind is itself part of the natural world. It is true, accord- ing to Objectivism, that materialism implies determinism, since for Objectiv- ism, free will is an aspect of human consciousness, but it remains for Temple- ton to show how identity combined with naturalism implies materialism. Leonard Peikoff has argued that free will is not inconsistent with man having a specif- ic nature, since (according to Objectivism) free will is part of the nature of man. Nor is it inconsistent with causal necessity, since (according to Objec- tivism) man MUST exercise choice -- he cannot escape the necessity of doing so. "PROBLEM 8: Artificial intelligence." Templeton argues that artificial intel- ligence is possible. He then asks: "What does AI tell us about reason?" He answers: For one, consciousness is not an irreducible primary, for we have reduced it. We may not understand how we did it, but when we do it, we will know we have reduced it. This problem of consciousness not being an irreducible primary has already been dealt with in my answer to PROBLEM 2 concerning what Objectivism means by "ir- reducible primary". As I indicated there, when Objectivism says that cons- ciousness is an irreducible primary, it does not mean that there are no precon- ditions of consciousness, such as a brain and sense organs. It means that one cannot analyze or "prove" consciousness as such. An attempt to prove it is self-contradictory; it is an attempt to prove consciousness by means of uncons- ciousness. Templeton continues: What's worse, we will certainly know the source of whatever "free will" this consciousness has. It may be a cosmic ray detector or any number of things, but what implications will this have on ethical questions? None as far as I can tell. What implications does Templeton have in mind? And why does he believe they would be disturbing to Objectivists?