Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!yale!husc6!rutgers!sri-spam!sri-unix!hplabs!tektronix!uw-beaver!cornell!svax!belmonte From: belmonte@svax.cs.cornell.edu (Matthew Belmonte) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Re: Dwyer's Response to Templeton on Objectivism (part 4 of 9) Message-ID: <590@svax.cs.cornell.edu> Date: Fri, 10-Oct-86 17:02:33 EDT Article-I.D.: svax.590 Posted: Fri Oct 10 17:02:33 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 16-Oct-86 06:25:16 EDT References: <152@vixie.UUCP> Distribution: world Organization: Cornell Univ. CS Dept. Lines: 62 In article <152@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > B) The Copenhagen Interpretation. > - things DON'T have a specific nature. It is meaningless to propose > that they do. > "A is approximately A" - will this be the new slogan? How about, > "A has a high probability of being A." > > If things don't have a specific nature, then it is not possible to draw any > conclusions about them, including the conclusion that they don't have a specif > ic nature. To say that "A is approximately A" would be meaningless itself, if > A were not A. For if A were not A, if it had no identity, how could one iden- > tify it as being approximately anything? If a thing is not itself but only ap > proximately itself, then if it is "approximately A", does that mean then that > it is approximately "approximately A"? And if so, does that in turn mean that > it is approximately "approximately 'approximately A'"? Evidently. We are thu > led to an infinite regress, in other words, to a contradiction. I'm not clear on how you arrive at the conclusion that this is contradictory. "Approximately" means within some bounds. (You're welcome to dispute this definition; I haven't my dictionary in hand right now.) Therefore, "Approximately approximately" means within some bounds that are within some bounds. If something is within some bounds that are within some bounds, then it certainly is within some bounds. Therefore, "Approximately approximately," and generally any series "approximately"**n, where n is in [1,infinity), is equivalent in meaning to "approximately." By "bounds," I mean physical, relational, or semantic (Is there any other general category I've left out?) constraints. > The statement "A has a high probability of being A" is no better. Is it TRUE > that "A has a high probability of being A" or is it merely highly probable? > And if it is merely highly probable, is that true, or merely highly probable? It is certainly true that if _A_ has a high probability of being _A_, then it is true that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_. This is tautological. If it is true that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_, then there is a high probability (namely, 100%) that there is a high probability of _A_ being _A_. But there is not _merely_ a high probability that there is a high probability of _A_ being _A_. > Etc. Furthermore, if A is not A, then how can one say that it -- A -- has a > high probability of being A. Yes, A has a high probability of being A (accord > ing to this view). But A may not be A; it may only have a high probability of > being A, in which case, one cannot say that IT has a high probability of being > A; one can only say it if it is A, and according to this theory, it may not be > A. According to this theory, _A_ may not be _A_. But we don't know that, and we have some evidence which supports _A_'s being _A_. So, WITHIN THE CURRENT CONTEXT, we say that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_. We admit that our knowledge (or belief) is fuzzy. If later on we find more evidence supporting _A_'s not being _A_ (although I can't imagine how this would happen -- I think there is opposition, but not contradiction, in the universe as a whole.), then the context has changed, and so has our belief about _A_. "Logic dictated that logic did not apply." -- Spock, "The Galileo Seven" -- Matthew Belmonte ARPA: BITNET: UUCP: ..!decvax!duke!duknbsr!mkb