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From: desj@brahms (David desJardins)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Characterization
Message-ID: <16@cartan.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Tue, 14-Oct-86 20:15:08 EDT
Article-I.D.: cartan.16
Posted: Tue Oct 14 20:15:08 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 16-Oct-86 19:34:58 EDT
References: <3279@caip.RUTGERS.EDU> <15634@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Sender: daemon@cartan.Berkeley.EDU
Reply-To: desj@brahms (David desJardins)
Organization: Math Dept. UC Berkeley
Lines: 52

In article <388@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes:
>   ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds of viewpoints of reality
>might be generated if we did *not* assume the universe was completely char-
>acterizable by Man.  Or ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds
>of viewpoints might be generated if we simply assumed that it was [is] not
>possible in practice to do so.
>   ... the latter I'm sure would be more palatable for you.

   I have this strange feeling that you and perhaps others are continuing
to ascribe to me a belief which I have not stated and do not hold.  I do
not claim, and have never claimed, that the universe is completely character-
izable by Man.  I merely object to statements made by Gallmeister and others
since that the universe is not so characterizable, when they are presented
with no evidence but with the implication that, "It is obvious that there
must be things that Man will never know."  This is *not* obvious, and no one
has presented *any* evidence to support it.

>   ... both "stances" are valuable; when I am doing physics, for example,
>I implicity assume the plausibility of the first case

   Exactly my point.  Some degree of this assumption seems necessary to do
physics.  Perhaps it is enough to believe that the universe is "mostly
characterizable" in some peculiar sense, but a physicist, in order to justify
his work, must at least believe that there is reason to think that the laws
of physics will continue to operate as they have in the past.  This is char-
acterizability at its most basic level.

>   ... when living life, I implicity assume the second, not in a strict
>sense but simply as a working rule (i.e., not in terms of being able to
>characterize "in principle" but simply "in practice.")

   My question is:  In what way is it *valuable* (as you say above) to make
this assumption?  To me in fact it seems harmful to go through life with no
belief in the continued operation of the universe in a manner that you can
understand.  But even if you hypothesize that the universe is uncharacter-
izable only in minor ways, or ones that will not directly affect your day-
to-day life, I cannot see how this could possibly be a *valuable* assumption.
   I guess I can see how it could be a *comfortable* assumption.  Most
religions are based on some sort of assumption of noncharacterizability in
the form of some superhuman force or being, and certainly people have chosen
to believe in such things for many millenia.  But I do not consider irrational
beliefs (or even rational ones) to have *value* simply because they are
comfortable.  Could you give a concrete example of how belief in noncharacter-
izability is of value in life?

   -- David desJardins

>P.S.  Since this was the main point of your posting, I thought I'd
>respond to only this.  I do have responses to your other comments,
>however, which I would be happy to email to you privately.

   Feel free.  Try ...!ucbvax!brahms!desj or brahms!desj@ucbvax.berkeley.edu.