Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!topaz!nike!oliveb!intelca!qantel!vixie!dwyer From: dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Dwyer's Response to Templeton on Objectivism (part 1 of 9) Message-ID: <150@vixie.UUCP> Date: Mon, 22-Sep-86 01:30:36 EDT Article-I.D.: vixie.150 Posted: Mon Sep 22 01:30:36 1986 Date-Received: Fri, 26-Sep-86 04:59:24 EDT Reply-To: dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) Distribution: world Organization: Vixie Enterprises, San Mateo, CA Lines: 97 A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism by William Dwyer (part 1 of 9) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP, posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or of the original article, are available upon request. Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Brad Templeton presents nine (though he says eight) problems which, he claims, he has yet to see an Objectivist answer. To begin with, Templeton lists the following principles which he alleges to be "fundamental axioms" of Objectivism: 1) Existence exists. 2) Consciousness exists and is an irreducible primary. 3) Man's consciousness has reliable senses for input. 4) The senses perceive an objective reality. 5) Reason is the only means to gain knowledge, and acts through integrat- ing the input of the senses. 6) Man has free will, at least regarding the decision to apply rational thought. 7) A is A, which means "things are what they are," which means that all things have a *specific* nature. It also means that you can't have A and NOT A. However, I do not believe that all of the principles listed here would be re- garded by Objectivism as "fundamental axioms". (Templeton may wish to debate this point, although I do not regard it as essential to his discussion.) The only truly fundamental axioms that I am aware of in Objectivism are the ep- istemological axioms of "existence", "consciousness" and "identity." At any rate, Templeton then argues that Objectivism's basis for its axioms (a basis which he claims to be "self-introspection") is inadequate for the follow- ing reason: Other people have self-introspected and not agreed with these ax- ioms; they have come up with different ones. "Now", he states, "you can't call these people who conceive of other ax- ioms irrational because they conceive of the others. That's circular -- you have defined rationality in terms of following your school of ra- tionality. "You must concede that other systems can also be derived from self- introspection by rational people, and since self-introspection was the basis of your own certainty in your axioms, you must question this." Hence, "PROBLEM 1: Does your self-introspection guarantee a correct appraisal of the outside world? (Objective reality) ANSWER: Only insofar as introspection presupposes extrospection -- only in- sofar as consciousness presupposes existence. If one wants to know what is outside, one must look outside. However, there is a way to ascertain whether a given concept is axiomatic or not: one ascertains it by observing the fact that an axiomatic concept cannot be escaped, that it is implicit in all knowledge, that it has to be ac- cepted and used even in the process of any attempt to deny it. For instance, when modern philosophers declare that axioms are a matter of arbitrary choice, and proceed to choose complex, derivative concepts as the alleged axioms of their alleged reasoning, one can observe that their statements imply and depend on "existence," "consciousness," "identity," which they profess to negate, but which are smuggled into their arguments in the form of unacknowledged, "stolen" concepts. [Ayn Rand, "Axiomatic Concepts," INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (Paper), p. 79] Templeton states: "(It's too complex to go into here, but if you really want some consistent metaphysical systems where A is not A or consciousness does not exist, I and others on the net can provide them. This article is long enough al- ready.)" Since it is the law of identity that defines consistency, a consistent metaphy- sical system in which A is not A is worse than a contradiction in terms. It is a contradiction in terms that explicitly forbid contradictions! If you can have a consistent metaphysical system in which A is not A, then what would an INCONSISTENT metaphysical system be? One in which A is A? What consistency means is a context in which you do not have both A and not A (at the same time and in the same respect). As for consistent metaphysical systems in which consciousness does not exist, it may indeed be possible to imagine them, but that does not refute the idea that consciousness is an EPISTEMOLOGICAL axiom. Whereas existence does not depend on consciousness; knowledge or proof definitely does. The ACTUAL ex- istence of consciousness cannot be denied without self-contradiction, for what is one denying it with? UNCONSCIOUSNESS?!