Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!yale!husc6!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex From: wex@milano.UUCP Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Re: Dwyer's Response to Templeton on Objectivism (part 1 of 9) Message-ID: <2421@milano.UUCP> Date: Tue, 23-Sep-86 12:45:30 EDT Article-I.D.: milano.2421 Posted: Tue Sep 23 12:45:30 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 29-Sep-86 00:57:13 EDT References: <150@vixie.UUCP> Sender: wex@milano.UUCP Distribution: world Organization: MCC, Austin, TX Lines: 61 In the past, I have avoided the Objectivist items because they seemed to be mostly flames. However, Bill Dwyer has started what looks like a reasoned discussion, so I will join in. In article <150@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > Since it is the law of identity that defines consistency, a consistent > metaphysical system in which A is not A is worse than a contradiction in > terms. If you can have a consistent metaphysical system in which A is > not A, then what would an INCONSISTENT metaphysical system be? One in > which A is A? What consistency means is a context in which you do not > have both A and not A (at the same time and in the same respect). I have two problems with this. First, it doesn't seem (intuitively) right. I don't think I need identity to have a consistent system. Perhaps one might invoke such a law in testing or disproving consistency? The second problem has to do with your assumption that P and not(P) are all that can be talked of. There is something called the law of the excluded middle which is used in some forms of logic and not used in others. In logics which use the excluded middle, the formula (P or not(P)) is always true. However, there are other logics in which this is not the case. In these logics, asserting not(not(P)) is not the same as asserting P. This sort of thinking is used in "intuitionist" logics, something of which I am woefully ignorant (mail.phil.tech readers: HELP!) More interestingly, it corresponds to some situations I encounter in the "real world." For example, say I edit a 300-page book. I am a very good proofreader and expect to catch all the spelling errors as I edit. Now, if you were to present me with the 300 pages, one at a time, and say "Is there a spelling error on this page?" I would say "No" 300 times. However, if you asked "Is there a spelling error somewhere in these 300 pages?" I would say "Yes". Contradiction? Depends on how you look at it. > As for consistent metaphysical systems in which consciousness does not > exist, it may indeed be possible to imagine them, but that does not refute > the idea that consciousness is an EPISTEMOLOGICAL axiom. Whereas existence > does not depend on consciousness; knowledge or proof definitely does. The > ACTUAL existence of consciousness cannot be denied without self- > contradiction, for what is one denying it with? UNCONSCIOUSNESS?! When I studied philosophy formally I had a professor who was a specialist in the works of Descartes. He claimed that this is what Descartes meant when he said "I think, therefore I am." That is, to say "I think, therefore I do not exist" seems somehow foolish. However, there is a deeper, more subtle problem with this. Why do we allow Descartes the "I"? That is, we can allow that there is thinking and/or consciousness, but why must we allow that this thing belongs to a unique individual self, distinct in some way from other (similar) selves? The possibilities of solipsism and of unitary consciousness still exist. This is why Objectivists are often reduced to saying "Existence exists" or "Something exists." (Although this point is minor here, it becomes more important later on.) -- Alan Wexelblat ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex "True victory is victory over oneself."