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From: dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: because I want it
Message-ID: <2570@watdcsu.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 21-Sep-86 14:11:39 EDT
Article-I.D.: watdcsu.2570
Posted: Sun Sep 21 14:11:39 1986
Date-Received: Mon, 29-Sep-86 01:29:49 EDT
References: <11700370@inmet> <698@ihlpf.UUCP> <2555@watdcsu.UUCP> <960@sunybcs.UUCP>
Reply-To: dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi)
Organization: Secular Humanist Conspiracy, Child Corruption Division
Lines: 61

In article <960@sunybcs.UUCP> colonel@sunybcs.UUCP (Col. G. L. Sicherman) writes:
>> Let X = "I wish Y to be so".  Mike Cherepov's statement I take as
>> meaning that "Y because[1] I wish Y to be so" is not so.  You have
>> attempted to show a counterexample, but all you have really shown is a
>> case where "Y because[2] I wish Y to be so".  This doesn't work as a
>> counterexample, because "because" doesn't have the same meaning in both
>> statements.
>
>I don't think the point of disagreement between you is a matter of language.

From the context it was taken from, ie. a discussion of appeals to
emotion, Michael's argument appeared very much to be an attempt to
justify inferences based on wishful thinking.  And one thing that was
essential to his argument was an ambiguity in the English language.
(Actually, there were two possible, closely related, ambiguities his
argument could have been based on.  The one I mentioned was the one I
thought was more likely.)

>Causality is a very old philosophical problem.  Some philosophers maintain
>that "to cause" is directly meaningful only when YOU cause something, as
>Mike did with his cat's name.  

I use the term "cause" in a sense that makes no distinction between
humans, animals, or inanimate objects.

>                            With Einsteinian relativity, different observers
>might differ over which of two events "caused" the other!

In special relativity, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
one event, A, to be a cause of another event, B, is that A appears to
precede B in *all* frames of reference.  If two observers can disagree
about the order in which two events occurred, then neither event caused
the other.

>Both of you will agree that something can be so because you _make_ it so.
>The hidden point of Mike's argument is that names are special: the will
>is the act.  I leave it to harder heads than mine to discuss the role
>of names in mathematics!

Hmmph.  Did Michael *hide* this point or did he *miss* this point?  It
has occurred to me that Michael might deliberately post arguments based
on subtle fallacies in order to force people to think.  Nah.  Couldn't
be.  Nobody would keep it up for so long.

>One interesting point about language:
>	(1) My dog's name is Willis.
>	(2) I call my dog Willis.
>Statement (1) can be held to reduce to statement (2), since (1) is true
>so long, and only so long, as (2) is true.  In what sense, then, need a
>name be said to _exist,_ if any utterance about it reduces to an utterance
>about calling?

Asking whether names "exist" could lead to a long, heated, and
unproductive discussions.  I think the question is meaningless, and
prefer to avoid heavy philosophical arguments over such questions by
using what I think of as the "DWH rule".  "DWH" stands for Describe
What Happens.  Reducing your statement (1) to your statement (2) is an
application of DWH.  The question of whether names "exist" can't, as
far as I know, be reduced to statements about events.
-- 
David Canzi