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From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Newsgroups: net.ai,net.cog-eng
Subject: Re: Searle, Turing, Symbols, Categories
Message-ID: <1882@mmintl.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 14-Oct-86 17:20:53 EDT
Article-I.D.: mmintl.1882
Posted: Tue Oct 14 17:20:53 1986
Date-Received: Sat, 18-Oct-86 23:27:39 EDT
References: <158@mind.UUCP> <150@cwrudg.UUCP> <160@mind.UUCP> <4865@ukmf.ukma.uky.csnet> <166@mind.UUCP>
Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT
Lines: 35
Keywords: Robotics, Symbol-Crunching, Category Representation, Analog Representation, Induction
Xref: mnetor net.ai:1202 net.cog-eng:292

In article <166@mind.UUCP> harnad@mind.UUCP writes:
>What I mean by a symbol is an
>arbitrary formal token, physically instantiated in some way (e.g., as
>a mark on a piece of paper or the state of a 0/1 circuit in a
>machine) and manipulated according to certain formal rules. The
>critical thing is that the rules are syntactic, that is, the symbol is
>manipulated on the basis of its shape only -- which is arbitrary,
>apart from the role it plays in the formal conventions of the syntax
>in question. The symbol is not manipulated in virtue of its "meaning."
>Its meaning is simply an interpretation we attach to the formal
>goings-on. Nor is it manipulated in virtue of a relation of
>resemblance to whatever "objects" it may stand for in the outside
>world, or in virtue of any causal connection with them. Those
>relations are likewise mediated only by our interpretations.

I see two problems with respect to this viewpoint.  One is that relating
purely symbolic functions to external events is essentially a solved
problem.  Digital audio recording, for example, works quite well.  Robotic
operations generally fail, when they do, not because of any problems with
the digital control of an analog process, but because the purely symbolic
portion of the process is inadequate.  In other words, there is every reason
to expect that a computer program able to pass the Turing test could be
extended to one able to pass the robotic version of the Turing test,
requiring additional development effort which is tiny by comparison (though
likely still measured in man-years).

Secondly, even in a purely formal environment, there turn out to be a lot of
real things to talk about.  Primitive concepts of time (before and after)
are understandable.  One can talk about nouns and verbs, sentences and
conversations, self and other.  I don't see any fundamental difference
between the ability to deal with symbols as real objects, and the ability to
deal with other kinds of real objects.

Frank Adams                           ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108