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From: kgd@rlvd.UUCP (Keith Dancey)
Newsgroups: net.ai,net.cog-eng
Subject: Re: Searle, Turing, Symbols, Categories
Message-ID: <1817@rlvd.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 3-Nov-86 12:41:54 EST
Article-I.D.: rlvd.1817
Posted: Mon Nov  3 12:41:54 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 7-Nov-86 21:56:12 EST
References: <158@mind.UUCP> <150@cwrudg.UUCP> <160@mind.UUCP> <2495@utai.UUCP> <1636@watdragon.UUCP> <5@mind.UUCP>
Reply-To: kgd@rlvd.UUCP (Keith Dancey)
Organization: Rutherford Appleton Laboratories, Atlas Buildings, U.K.
Lines: 32
Xref: watmath net.ai:3868 net.cog-eng:822

In article <5@mind.UUCP> harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) writes:
>
>
>What do you think "having intelligence" is? Turing's criterion
>effectively made it: having performance capacity that is indistinguishable
>from human performance capacity. And that's all "having a mind"
>amounts to (by this objective criterion). ...
 
At the risk of sidetracking this discussion, I don't think it wise to try
and equate 'mind' and 'intelligence'.  A 'mind' is an absolute thing, but
'intelligence' is relative.
 
For instance, most people would, I believe, accept that a monkey has a
'mind'.  However, they would not necessarily so easily accept that a
monkey has 'performance capacity that is indistinguishable from human
performance capacity'.
 
On the other hand, many people would accept that certain robotic
processes had 'intelligence', but would be very reluctant to attribute
them with 'minds'.
 
I think there is something organic about 'minds', but 'intelligence' can
be codified, within limits, of course.
 
I apologise if this appears as a red-herring in the argument.
 
-- 
Keith Dancey,                                UUCP:   ..!mcvax!ukc!rlvd!kgd
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory,
Chilton, Didcot, Oxon  OX11 0QX             
                                            JANET:       K.DANCEY@uk.ac.rl
Tel: (0235) 21900   ext 5716