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From: desj@brahms (David desJardins)
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Re: Launching shuttles soon
Message-ID: <227@cartan.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Sun, 9-Nov-86 03:45:57 EST
Article-I.D.: cartan.227
Posted: Sun Nov  9 03:45:57 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 9-Nov-86 08:33:05 EST
References: <7254@utzoo.UUCP> <346@xios.UUCP> <7275@utzoo.UUCP>
Sender: daemon@cartan.Berkeley.EDU
Reply-To: desj@brahms (David desJardins)
Organization: Math Dept. UC Berkeley
Lines: 79

In article <1135@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> jon@cit-vax.UUCP (Jon Leech) writes:
>>   I find this very hard to believe.  Certainly there was no problem with
>>finding people to fly on the first shuttle flight, with a *much* greater
>>risk than the 26th -- why would they suddenly not want to fly?
>
>    I find it very easy to believe. The first flights of the shuttle
>were flown by experienced test pilots who knew and accepted high risks.
>The Mission Specialists and Payload Specialists are there to do a different
>job, one which should not require undue risk of life. Without these people,
>perhaps shuttles can be flown, but they won't be doing nearly as much.

   The original proposal was a resumption of flights with military crews.
In any case, those who are willing to fly should fly, and those who are
not should not.  I still believe (Ms. Ride's statements notwithstanding)
that there will be plenty of volunteers.

>    If so, perhaps it is because her membership on the Rogers Commission
>gave her a better understanding of the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle
>program.

   Certainly possible.  The converse is also possible -- that she was chosen
for the commission because of her views on safety.
   The Rogers Commission "discovered" very little, and what they did every-
one else now knows from their report.  Mostly what the Rogers Commission
did is publish their opinions about how NASA should be run (or, if you
prefer, "the many flaws in NASA and the shuttle program").  I seriously
doubt that it would cause any serious change in the opinions of any person
who was already knowledgeable about the program.
   The basic question should be, "What is an acceptable level of risk?"
Not, "How can we completely minimize risk?"  We do the latter simply by
never flying at all.

>>   Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we
>>should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to
>>be resumed).
>
>    This is ridiculous. We certainly don't need astronauts if the
>shuttle is not going to fly again.

   If at some time in the future (say, after another accident) we need
to fly the shuttle despite known safety problems, it would certainly be
desirable to have trained crews who are willing to fly.

>Since it is, we need the current astronauts, who have the most experience
>and familiarity with the system.

   But mostly we need people who are willing to do their jobs when the
need arises.  At any rate, I really doubt that this is seriously a problem,
since I still find it impossible to imagine that any substantial number
of the current astronauts would refuse to fly.

>Offering their - or any - lives to a system with at least one demonstrated 
>fatal failure mode is very generous for people who are NOT that familiar 
>and who won't fly themselves.

   Why is it different than the 25th flight, where we DID offer the crew's
lives to a system with at least one (undemonstrated) fatal failure mode?
Or the 27th flight, on which we WILL offer their lives to a system with
at least one still undemonstrated fatal failure mode?  You are just as
dead if you are killed by an undemonstrated failure mode as you are if
you are killed by a demonstrated mode.
   If you are saying that we should never fly the shuttle unless and until
we are certain that there are NO fatal failure modes, then we are never
going to fly it at all, and one is left to wonder why we built them in
the first place.

>    Waiting until 1988 for another shuttle flight is unpleasant,
>but we'll be waiting a hell of a lot longer if we start flying them
>again and lose another one. 

   We definitely need a commitment to replace any shuttles that are
lost.  Self-insurance is hardly a complicated notion.  Let us make the
pessimistic assumption that there is a 1% additional chance of joint
failure for each launch before the problem is fixed, and the optimistic
assumption that we can conduct 5 launches in this time.  At $2.5G per
shuttle, this comes to $125M expected additional cost for these flights.
Can we really not afford this?

   -- David desJardins