Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Path: utzoo!mnetor!seismo!lll-crg!nike!rutgers!clyde!bellcore!ulysses!allegra!princeton!mind!harnad
From: harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng
Subject: Re: Searle, Turing, Symbols, Categories
Message-ID: <215@mind.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 16-Nov-86 02:32:39 EST
Article-I.D.: mind.215
Posted: Sun Nov 16 02:32:39 1986
Date-Received: Mon, 17-Nov-86 08:57:22 EST
References: <158@mind.UUCP> <150@cwrudg.UUCP> <160@mind.UUCP> <2495@utai.UUCP> <2805@clyde.ATT.COM>
Organization: Cognitive Science, Princeton University
Lines: 60
Summary: 2nd pass at sorting out all-or-none matters from matters of degree, and operational definitions from experiential ones
Xref: mnetor comp.ai:33 comp.cog-eng:7


spf@bonnie.UUCP (Steve Frysinger) of AT&T Bell Laboratories, Whippany NJ
writes:

>	What is your operational definition (a la Bridgeman) of mind,
>	or of intelligence?

Don't have one. Don't need one. And neither you nor I would recognize
one or have any basis for accepting one if we saw one. But we DO know
we have a mind (at least I do -- this is not intended facetiously, but
as a reminder of the basic point at issue, namely, the "other-minds"
problem), first-hand, without drawing on any "operational
definition." THAT's what we're trying to guess whether anyone
or anything ELSE but ourselves has. And I'm proposing the Total
Turing Test (a) because it's what we use already in all cases but our
own personal one, (b) because it gives cognitive science an empirical
problem to work with (modeling total performance capacity) and (c)
because there don't seem to be any nonarbitrary alternatives.

>	Is a mind a brain? If so, does any creature with a neurological
>	complex (no matter how simple) have a mind (and for that matter,
>	can we not contemplate a non-neurological brain)?

Brains have minds. I have no idea how far down the phylogenetic scale
that is true. Yes, we can contemplate a non-neurological brain; that's
what the robotic functionalism I advocate aims toward. But it's an
empirical question how many brain-like properties a device must have
to generate mind-like total performance capacity.

>	Is mind conciousness? Does that mean that my unconscious experiences
>	are "mindless"?

I am conscious, which is synonymous with "I have a mind." To be conscious
is to have qualitative experience. Strictly speaking, the consciousness is
only going on while experiences are going on. When I'm unconscious, I'm
unconscious.  But since I'm still alive, and wake up eventually (and, though
this is not necessary to the point, since when I wake up I experience a sense
of continuity with my prior experience), it seems reasonable to say
that I have a mind all along, only sometimes it's turned off.
"Unconscious experiences" (not to be confused with forgotten
experiences) is a contradiction in terms.

>	[1] Is mind intelligence? [2] Does that mean that folks who
>	consistently exhibit unintelligent characteristics have no mind?

[1] People (and animals, and perhaps future robots) are intelligent.
"Mind" is not synonymous with "intelligence" (why should it be?). Nor
is having a mind synonymous with having intelligence, although it may
be a sufficient, and possibly even a necessary condition for it. [2]
As I suggested in the module you are commenting on, intelligence does admit
of degrees, but not mind. But whereas I can imagine a person or animal
that is less intelligent than most others, I can't imagine one with no
intelligence at all. (This still does not make mind synonymous with
intelligence; they may be causally related, or merely correlated.)

-- 

Stevan Harnad                                  (609) - 921 7771
{allegra, bellcore, seismo, rutgers, packard}  !princeton!mind!harnad
harnad%mind@princeton.csnet