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From: harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad)
Newsgroups: sci.physics
Subject: Re: Scientific beliefs
Message-ID: <219@mind.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 19-Nov-86 00:31:24 EST
Article-I.D.: mind.219
Posted: Wed Nov 19 00:31:24 1986
Date-Received: Wed, 19-Nov-86 05:40:39 EST
References: <247@sri-arpa.ARPA>
Organization: Cognitive Science, Princeton University
Lines: 14
Summary: Truth by definition

In article <247@sri-arpa.ARPA>, KFL@MX.LCS.MIT.EDU "Keith F. Lynch"
writes:
>     > "All scientific beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment"
>       ...is not a scientific belief, but a definition.

And what argument is there for adhering to that definition? What other
issues can be settled by proffering a definition? (This problem is at
least as old as Hume; I recommend reading Lewis Carroll on Achilles and
the Tortoise.)
-- 

Stevan Harnad                                  (609) - 921 7771
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