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From: harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad)
Newsgroups: sci.physics
Subject: Re: Reverse causality
Message-ID: <220@mind.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 19-Nov-86 00:47:40 EST
Article-I.D.: mind.220
Posted: Wed Nov 19 00:47:40 1986
Date-Received: Wed, 19-Nov-86 05:40:57 EST
References: <240@sri-arpa.ARPA> <201@mind.UUCP> <3942@jhunix.UUCP>
Organization: Cognitive Science, Princeton University
Lines: 22
Summary: Experiments on falsifiability...

In article <3942@jhunix.UUCP>, ins_akaa@jhunix.UUCP (Ken Arromdee) writes:
> >> All scientific beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment.
> >For example, I suppose, the scientific belief that all scientific
> >beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment...
> 
> this does make sense... doesn't lead to a contradiction unless
> one such experiment produces the paradoxical result.

What is "the paradoxical result"? If it is true that "All scientific
beliefs are falsifiable by experiment" (F) and F is itself a
scientific belief, then either (1) F is falsifiable (and I'd be
interested to hear a potential scenario for getting such a result), in
which case the generalization is valid, or (2) F is not falsifiable,
in which case the generalization is simply false. There's no paradox here; no
self-denying statements. Just the (Popperian variant) on a problem as
old as Hume: The apparent impossibility of justifying induction
without already presupposing or relying on it in doing so.
-- 

Stevan Harnad                                  (609) - 921 7771
{allegra, bellcore, seismo, rutgers, packard}  !princeton!mind!harnad
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