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From: mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng
Subject: Re: More on Minsky on Mind(s)
Message-ID: <2112@dciem.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 30-Jan-87 18:35:23 EST
Article-I.D.: dciem.2112
Posted: Fri Jan 30 18:35:23 1987
Date-Received: Fri, 30-Jan-87 20:42:39 EST
References: <460@mind.UUCP> <1032@cuuxb.UUCP> <465@mind.UUCP> <470@mind.UUCP>
Reply-To: mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor)
Organization: D.C.I.E.M., Toronto, Canada
Lines: 23
Keywords: mind-modeling, 1st-order awareness, higher-order awareness
Xref: dciem comp.ai:184 comp.cog-eng:46
Summary: 


>     More ironic still, in arguing for the TTT and methodological
>epiphenomenalism, I am actually saying: "Why do you care? Worrying about
>consciousness will get you nowhere, and there's objective empirical
>work to do!"
>
That's a highly prejudiced, anti-empirical point of view: "Ignore Theory A.
It'll never help you.  Theory B will explain the data better, whatever
they may prove to be!"

Sure, there's all sorts of objective empirical work to do.  There's lots
of experimental work to do as well.  But there is also theoretical work
to be done, to find out how best to describe our world.  If the descriptions
are simpler using a theory that embodies consciousness than using one that
does not, then we SHOULD assume consciousness.  Whether this is the case
is itself an empirical question, which cannot be begged by asserting
(correctly) that all behaviour can be explained without resort to
consciousness.
-- 

Martin Taylor
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