Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watnot!watmath!clyde!rutgers!lll-lcc!well!wcalvin From: wcalvin@well.UUCP Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng Subject: Re: More on Minsky on Mind(s) Message-ID: <2580@well.UUCP> Date: Fri, 13-Feb-87 22:33:12 EST Article-I.D.: well.2580 Posted: Fri Feb 13 22:33:12 1987 Date-Received: Sun, 15-Feb-87 00:13:01 EST References: <460@mind.UUCP> <1032@cuuxb.UUCP> <465@mind.UUCP> <2556@well.UUCP> <490@mind.UUCP> Reply-To: wcalvin@well.UUCP (William Calvin) Organization: Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link, Sausalito, CA Lines: 77 Keywords: Consciousness, throwing, command buffer, evolution, foresight Xref: utgpu comp.ai:232 comp.cog-eng:62 Summary: A mechanical equivalent of consciousness? Stevan Harnad replies to my Darwin Machine proposal for consciousness (2256@well.uucp) as follows: > Summary: No objective account of planning for the future can give an independent causal role to consciousness, so why bother? > wcalvin@well.UUCP writes: > >> Rehearsing movements may be the key to appreciating the brain >> mechanisms [of consciousness and free will] > > But WHY do the functional mechanisms of planning have to be conscious? > ...Every one of the internal functions described for a planning, > past/future-oriented device of the kind Minsky describes (and we too > could conceivably be) would be physically, causally and functionally EXACTL Y > THE SAME--i.e., would accomplish the EXACT same things, by EXACTLY the same > means -- WITHOUT being interpreted as being conscious. So what functional > work is the consciousness doing? And if none, what is the justification > for the conscious interpretation of any such processes...? > Why bother? Why bother to talk about the subject at all? Because one hopes to understand the subject, maybe extend our capabilities a little by appreciating the mechanistic underpinning a little better. I am describing a stochastic-plus-selective process that, I suggest, accounts for many of the things which are ordinarily subsumed under the topic of consciousness. I'd like the reactions of people who've argued consciousness more than I have, who could perhaps improve on my characterization or point out what it can't subsume. I don't claim that these functional aspects of planning (I prefer to just say "scenario-spinning" rather than something as purposeful-sounding as planning) are ALL of consciousness -- they seem a good bet to me, worthy of careful examination, so as to better delineate what's left over after such stochastic-plus-selective processes are accounted for. But to talk about consciousness as being purely personal and subjective and hence beyond research -- that's just a turn-off to developing better approaches that are less dependent on slippery words. That's why one bothers. We tend to think that humans have something special going for them in this area. It is often confused with mere appreciation of one's world (perceiving pain, etc.) but there's nothing uniquely human about that. The world we perceive is probably a lot more detailed than that of a spider -- and even of a chimp, thanks to our constant creation of new schemata via word combinations. But if there is something more than that, I tend to think that it is in the area of scenario-spinning: foresight, "free will" as we choose between candidate scenarios, self- consciousness as we see ourselves poised at the intersection of several scenarios leading to alternative futures. I have proposed a mechanistic neurophysiological model to get us started thinking about this aspect of human experience; I expect it to pare away one aspect of "consciousness" so as to better define, if anything, what remains. Maybe there really is a little person inside the head, but I am working on the assumption that such distributed properties of stochastic neural networks will account for the whole thing, including how we shift our attention from one thing to another. Even William James in 1890 saw attention as a matter of competing scenarios: [Attention] is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought." To those offended by the notion that "chance rules," I would point out that it doesn't: like mutations and permutations of genes, neural stochastic events serve as the generators of novelty -- but it is selection by one's memories (often incorporated as values, ethics, and such) that determine what survives. Those values rule. We choose between the options we generate, and often without overt action -- we just form a new memory, a judgement on file to guide future choices and actions. And apropos chance, I cannot resist quoting Halifax: "He that leavth nothing to chance will do few things ill, but he will do very few things." He probably wasn't using "chance" in quite the sense that I am, but it's still appropriate when said using my stochastic sense too. William H. Calvin BITNET: wcalvin@uwalocke University of Washington USENET: wcalvin@well.uucp Biology Program NJ-15 206/328-1192 or 543-1648 Seattle WA 98195