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From: haynes@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU.UUCP
Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,comp.unix.questions
Subject: Re: UNIX file setuid sucurity hole?
Message-ID: <17822@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Fri, 13-Mar-87 01:46:33 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.17822
Posted: Fri Mar 13 01:46:33 1987
Date-Received: Sat, 14-Mar-87 02:09:11 EST
References: <2168@ncoast.UUCP>
Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: haynes@ucbarpa.Berkeley.EDU.UUCP (Jim Haynes)
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Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz
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Xref: utgpu comp.unix.wizards:1354 comp.unix.questions:1348

On our student machines we hack the kernel to prevent setting the
setuid bit by a non-privileged user.  If some user really needs it
set he can request that of root.  We don't get too many requests.
I made this change reluctantly after finding the system riddled
with hundreds of setuid shells that would let one user into another
user's account.  They were obtained by writing a game or other
utility, inviting everyone to try it, and it had a secret side
effect of creating a setuid shell.

Jim Haynes
haynes@ucscc.bitnet
haynes@ucbarpa.berkeley.edu
...ucbvax!ucscc!haynes