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From: dce@mips.UUCP
Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,comp.bugs.4bsd
Subject: 4.3BSD login - logging in as root
Message-ID: <274@quacky.mips.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 10-Apr-87 09:42:12 EST
Article-I.D.: quacky.274
Posted: Fri Apr 10 09:42:12 1987
Date-Received: Sat, 11-Apr-87 17:17:34 EST
Reply-To: dce@quacky.UUCP (David Elliott)
Followup-To: comp.unix.wizards
Distribution: world
Organization: MIPS Computer Systems, Sunnyvale, CA
Lines: 24
Xref: utgpu comp.unix.wizards:1722 comp.bugs.4bsd:285


(This may actually apply in a broad sense to a 4.2BSD system as well,
even though a different security method is used, but I don't have one
that I can try it on.)

In 4.3BSD, one can only login as root on a port if the port is marked
"secure" in /etc/ttys. If you try to login as root on a port not marked
as such, the message "Login incorrect." is printed and you get a new
login prompt.

Our system administrator ran into this a couple of weeks ago when working
a newly-installed system (we don't ship /etc/ttys with ptys marked as
secure; should we?).

This struck him (and me) as odd, since the classic scenario in Unix
security is that login should *always* prompt for a password to make
sure that someone trying to break in can't tell if the username is
valid or not. The idea is that telling a breaker that an account name
is or isn't valid is giving him/her an edge, and so should be avoided.

Is there a good reason that login shouldn't go ahead and prompt for a
password in this case just for the sake of consistency?
-- 
David Elliott		{decvax,ucbvax,ihnp4}!decwrl!mips!dce