Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ucbvax!jade!violet.berkeley.edu!ed298-ak From: ed298-ak@violet.berkeley.edu.UUCP Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Deduciblity as knowledge (Re: Uncertainty in life) Message-ID: <3722@jade.BERKELEY.EDU> Date: Tue, 26-May-87 12:46:19 EDT Article-I.D.: jade.3722 Posted: Tue May 26 12:46:19 1987 Date-Received: Thu, 28-May-87 06:45:15 EDT References: <6762@mimsy.UUCP> <13261@watmath.UUCP> <3978@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU> Sender: usenet@jade.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: lagache@violet.berkeley.edu (Edouard Lagache) Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 28 Keywords: Descartes, Proof theory, Theory of Knowledge Summary: What is knowledge other than stuff that you can show is true? In article <3978@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU> ma188saa@sdcc3.ucsd.edu.UUCP (Steve Bloch) writes: >>a contradiction is reached because we have taken as certain the hypothesis >>that nothing can be known for certain. Therefore, it must be so that you can >>know something for certain. >> >Did Descartes really say that? I'm disappointed. Let X, in the >following sentence, be "nothing can be known for certain." >The truth of X does not imply that anybody KNOWS X. It seems to be that the above argument misses the point of Descartes. It is merely that X is true, but that he, Descartes, showed it to be true. If the mind deduce from things that are aleady known to a valid conclusion, then the nature of deduction allows you to "know" the conclusion. Descartes can be faulted from another flaw. If we assume that nothing can be known for certain, then we don't know for certain that contradictories are incompatible. So the logical engine Descartes wants to use also breaks down, and nothing can be deduced. However, denying that logic works is a very unconfortable position to be in. So in some sense of "pragmatic", I think that Descartes argument is basically sound. Edouard Lagache School of Education U.C. Berkeley lagache@violet.berkeley.edu