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From: dhesi@bsu-cs.UUCP
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Deduciblity as knowledge (Re: Uncertainty in life)
Message-ID: <728@bsu-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 27-May-87 15:23:37 EDT
Article-I.D.: bsu-cs.728
Posted: Wed May 27 15:23:37 1987
Date-Received: Fri, 29-May-87 01:49:12 EDT
References: <6762@mimsy.UUCP> <13261@watmath.UUCP> <3978@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU> <3722@jade.BERKELEY.EDU>
Reply-To: dhesi@bsu-cs.UUCP (Rahul Dhesi)
Organization: CS Dept, Ball St U, Muncie, Indiana
Lines: 19
Keywords: Descartes, Proof theory, Theory of Knowledge

In article <3722@jade.BERKELEY.EDU> lagache@violet.berkeley.edu (Edouard 
Lagache) writes:
>In article <3978@sdcc3.ucsd.EDU> ma188saa@sdcc3.ucsd.edu.UUCP (Steve Bloch) 
writes:
[a self-inconsistent discussion of self-inconsistent reasoning by Descartes]

Doesn't the paradox exist because we force it to exist despite knowing
better?  It would be more accurate to say, "Only one thing can be known
for certain, and that is that nothing else can be known for certain."
Although I doubt that even that is universally true, for "certainty" 
itself depends on what we define it to be.

Consider a set that contains itself, and contains every other set that
does not contain itself.  Where's the paradox?

Paradoxes arise when you choose an inconsistent set of axioms.  "Doctor,
it hurts when I do that!"  "Don't do that!"
-- 
Rahul Dhesi         UUCP:  {ihnp4,seismo}!{iuvax,pur-ee}!bsu-cs!dhesi