Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!clyde!rutgers!princeton!mind!harnad
From: harnad@mind.UUCP
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng
Subject: Re: The symbol grounding problem
Message-ID: <812@mind.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 7-Jun-87 14:25:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: mind.812
Posted: Sun Jun  7 14:25:00 1987
Date-Received: Sun, 7-Jun-87 23:39:31 EDT
References: <764@mind.UUCP> <768@mind.UUCP> <770@mind.UUCP> <6174@diamond.BBN.COM> <6358@diamond.BBN.COM>
Organization: Cognitive Science, Princeton University
Lines: 221
Keywords: icons, categories, symbols, grounding, modularity, cognition
Xref: utgpu comp.ai:457 comp.cog-eng:103
Summary: The A/D distinction vs. the Symbolic/Nonsymbolic Distinction



aweinste@Diamond.BBN.COM (Anders Weinstein)
of BBN Laboratories, Inc., Cambridge, MA writes:

>	[regarding invertibility, information preservation and the A/D
>	distinction]: what I think is interesting is not preserving the
>	signal itself but rather the *information* that the signal carries.
>	In this sense, an analog signal conveys only a finite amount of
>	information and it can in fact be converted to digital form and back
>	to analog *without* any loss.

This is an important point and concerns a matter that is at the heart
of the symbolic/nonsymbolic issue: What you're saying is appropriate for
ordinary communication theory and communication-theoretic
applications such as radio signals, telegraph, radar CDs, etc. In all these
cases the signal is simply a carrier that encodes information which is
subsequently decoded at the receiving end. But in the case of human
cognition this communication-theoretic model -- of signals carrying
messages that are encoded/decoded on either end -- may not be
appropriate. (Formal information theory has always had difficulties
with "content" or "meaning." This has often been pointed out, and I take
this to be symptomatic of the fact that it's missing something as a
candidate model for cognitive "information processing.")

Note that the communication-theoretic, signal-analytic view has a kind of 
built-in bias toward digital coding, since it's the "message" and not
the "medium" that matters. But what if -- in cognition -- the medium
*is* the message? This may well be the case in iconic processing (and
the performances that it subserves, such as discrimination, similarity
judgment, matching, short-term memory, mental rotation, etc.): It may
be the structure or "shape" of the physical signal (the stimulus) itself that
matters, not some secondary information or message it carries in coded
form. Hence the processing may have to be structure- or shape-preserving
in the physical analog sense I've tried to capture with the criterion
of invertibiliy.

>	a *digitized* image -- in your terms... is "analog" in the
>	information it preserves and not in the information lost. This
>	seems to me to be a very unhappy choice of terminology! Both analog
>	and digitizing transformations must preserve *some* information.
>	If all you're *really* interested in is the quality of being
>	(naturally) information-preserving (i.e. physically invertible),
>	than I'd strongly recommend you just use one of these terms and drop
>	the misleading use of "analog", "iconic", and "digital".

I'm not at all convinced yet that the sense of iconic and analog that I am
referring to is unrelated to the signal-analytic A/D distinction,
although I've noted that it may turn out, on sufficient analysis, to be
an independent distinction. For the time being, I've acknowledged that
my invertibility criterion is, if not necessarily unhappy, somewhat
surprising in its implications, for it implies (1) that being analog
may be a matter of degree (i.e., degree of invertibility) and (2) even
a classical digital system must be regarded as analog to a degree if
one is considering a larger "dedicated" system of which it is a
hard-wired (i.e., causally connected) component rather than an
independent (human-interpretation-mediated) module.

Let me repeat, though, that it could turn out that, despite some
suggestive similarities, these considerations are not pertinent to the
A/D distinction but, say, to the symbolic/nonsymbolic distinction --
and even that only in the special context of cognitive modeling rather than
signal analysis or artificial intelligence in general.

>	With regard to [the] "symbol grounding problem": I think it's been
>	well-understood for some time that causal interaction with the world
>	is a necessary requirement for artificial intelligence...
>	The philosophical rationale for this requirement is the fact that
>	some causal "grounding" is needed in order to determine a semantic
>	interpretation... But although everyone agrees that *some* kind of
>	causal grounding is necessary for intentionality, it's notoriously
>	difficult to explain exactly what sort it must be. And although the
>	information-preserving transformations you discuss may play some role
>	here, I really don't see how this challenges the premises of symbolic
>	AI in the way you seem to think it does.

As far as I know, there have so far been only two candidate proposals
to overcome the symbol grounding problem WITHOUT resorting to the kind
of hybrid proposal I advocate (i.e., without giving up purely symbolic
top-down modules): One proposal, as you note, is that a pure
symbol-manipulating system can be "grounded" by merely hooking it up
causally in the "right way" to the outside world with simple (modular)
transducers and effectors. I have conjectured that this strategy 
will not work in cognitive modeling (and I have given my supporting
arguments elsewhere: "Minds, Machines and Searle"). The strategy may work
in AI and conventional robotics and vision, but that is because these
fields *do not have a grounding problem*! They're only trying to generate
intelligent *pieces* of performance, not to model the mind in *all* its
performance capacity. Only cognitive modeling has a symbol grounding
problem.

The second nonhybrid way to try to ground a purely symbolic system in
real-world objects is by cryptology. Human beings, knowing already at least
one grounded language and its relation to the world, can infer the meanings
of a second one [e.g., ancient cuneiform] by using its internal formal
structure plus what they already know: Since the symbol permutations and
combinations of the unknown system (i.e., its syntactic rules) are constrained
to yield a semantically interpretatable system, sometimes the semantics can be
reliably and uniquely decoded this way (despite Quine's claims about the
indeterminacy of radical translation). It is obvious, however, that such
a "grounding" would be derivative, and would depend entirely on the
groundedness of the original grounded symbol system. (This is equivalent
to Searle's "intrinsic" vs. "derived intentionality.") And *that* grounding
problem remains to be solved in an autonomous cognitive model.

My own hybrid approach is simply to bite the bullet and give up on the
hope of an autonomous symbolic level, the hope on which AI and symbolic
functionalism had relied in their attempt to capture mental function.
Although you can get a lot of clever performance by building in purely 
symbolic "knowledge," and although it had seemed so promising that
symbol-strings could be interpreted as thoughts, beliefs, and mental
propositions, I have argued that a mere extension of this modular "top-down" 
approach, hooking up eventually with peripheral modules, simply won't
succeed in the long run (i.e., as we attempt to approach an asymptote of
total human performance capacity, or what I've called the "Total Turing Test")
because of the grounding problem and the nonviability of the two
"solutions" sketched above (i.e., simple peripheral hook-ups and/or
mediating human cryptology). Instead, I have described a nonmodular
hybrid representational system in which symbolic representations are
grounded bottom-up in nonsymbolic ones (iconic and categorical).
Although there is a symbolic level in such a system, it is not quite
the autonomous all-purpose level of symbolic AI. It trades its autonomy
for its groundedness.

>	[W]hy must the arrangement you envision be "nonmodular"? A system
>	may contain analog and digital subsystems and still be modular if
>	the subsystems interact solely via well-defined inputs and outputs.

I'll try to explain why I believe that a successful mind-model (one
able to pass the Total Turing Test) is unlikely to consist merely of a
pure symbol-manipulative module connected to input/output modules.
A pure top-down symbol system just consists of physically implemented
symbol manipulations. You yourself describe a typical example of
ungroundedness (from Georges Rey):

>		it's possible that a program for playing chess could,
>		when compiled, be *identical* to one used to plot
>		strategy in the Six Day War. If you look only at the
>		formal symbol manipulations, you can't distinguish between
>		the two interpretations; it's only by virtue of the causal
>		relations between the symbols and the world that the symbols
>		could have one meaning rather than another.

Now consider two cases of "fixing" the symbol interpretations by
grounding the causal relations between the symbols and the world. In
(1) a "toy" case -- a circumscribed little chunk of performance such as
chess-playing or war-games -- the right causal connections could be
wired according to the human encryption/decryption scheme: Inputs and
outputs could be wired into their appropriate symbolic descriptions.
There is no problem here, because the toy problems are themselves
modular, and we know all the ins and outs. But none but the most
diehard symbolic functionalist would want to argue that such a simple
toy model was "thinking," or even doing anything remotely like what we
do when we accomplish the same performance. The reason is that we are
capable of doing *so much more* -- and not by an assemblage of endless
independent modules of essentially the same sort as these toy models,
but by some sort of (2) integrated internal system. Could that "total"
system be just an oversized toy model -- a symbol system with its
interpretations "fixed" by a means analogous to these toy cases? I am
conjecturing that it is not.

Toy models don't think. Their internal symbols really *are*
meaningless, and hence setting them in the service of generating a toy
performance just involves hard-wiring our intended interpretations
of its symbols into a suitable dedicated system. Total (human-capacity-sized)
models, on the other hand, will, one hopes, think, and hence the
intended interpretations of their symbols will have to be intrinsic in
some deeper way than the analogy with the toy model would suggest, at
least so I think. This is my proposed "nonmodular" candidate:

Every formal symbol system has both primitive atomic symbols and composite
symbol-strings consisting of ruleful combinations of the atoms. Both
the atoms and the combinations are semantically interpretable, but
from the standpoint of the formal syntactic rules governing the symbol
manipulations, the atoms could just as well have been undefined or
meaningless. I hypothesize that the primitive symbols of a nonmodular
cognitive symbol system are actually the (arbitrary) labels of object
categories, and that these labels are reliably assigned to their referents
by a nonsymbolic representational system consisting of (i) iconic (invertible,
one-to-one) transformations of the sensory surface and (ii) categorical
(many-to-few) representations that preserve only the features that suffice to
reliably categorize and label sensory projections of the objects in
question. Hence, rather than being primitive and undefined, and hence
independent of interpretation, I suggest that the atoms of cognitive
symbol systems are grounded, bottom-up, in such a categorization
mechanism. The higher-order symbol combinations inherit the bottom-up
constraints, including the nonsymbolic representations to which they
are attached, rather than being an independent top-down symbol-manipulative
module with its connections to an input/output module open to being
fixed in various extrinsically determined ways.

>	it isn't clear why *any* (intuitively) analog processing need
>	take place at all. I presume the stance of symbolic AI is that
>	sensory input affects the system via an isolable module which converts
>	incoming stimuli into symbolic representations. Imagine a vision
>	sub-system that converts incoming light into digital form at the
>	first stage, as it strikes a grid of photo-receptor surfaces, and is
>	entirely digital from there on in. Such a system is still "grounded"
>	in information-preserving representations in the sense you require.
>	In short, I don't see any *philosophical* reason why symbol-grounding
>	requires analog processing or a non-modular structure.

It is exactly this modular scenario that I am calling into question. It
is not clear at all that a cognitive system must conform to it. To get a
device to be able to do what we can do we may have to stop thinking in
terms of "isolable" input modules that go straight into symbolic
representations. That may be enough to "ground" a conventional toy
system, but, as I've said, such toy systems don't have a grounding problem
in the first place, because nobody really believes they're thinking. To get
closer to life-size devices -- devices that can generate *all* of our
performance capacity, and hence may indeed be thinking -- we may have to
turn to hybrid systems in which the symbolic functions are nonmodularly
grounded, bottom-up, in the nonsymbolic ones. The problem is not a
philosophical one, it's an empirical one: What looks as if it's likely
to work, on the evidence and reasoning available?

-- 

Stevan Harnad                                  (609) - 921 7771
{bellcore, psuvax1, seismo, rutgers, packard}  !princeton!mind!harnad
harnad%mind@princeton.csnet       harnad@mind.Princeton.EDU