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From: harwood@cvl.UUCP
Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng
Subject: Re: The symbol grounding problem
Message-ID: <2282@cvl.umd.edu>
Date: Sun, 14-Jun-87 11:03:51 EDT
Article-I.D.: cvl.2282
Posted: Sun Jun 14 11:03:51 1987
Date-Received: Tue, 16-Jun-87 01:05:26 EDT
References: <764@mind.UUCP> <768@mind.UUCP> <770@mind.UUCP> <6174@diamond.BBN.COM> <6544@diamond.BBN.COM> <843@mind.UUCP>
Reply-To: harwood@cvl.UUCP (David Harwood)
Organization: Center for Automation Research, Univ. of Md.
Lines: 67
Xref: utgpu comp.ai:486 comp.cog-eng:116

In article <843@mind.UUCP> harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) writes:
>
(... replying to Anders Weinstein ...who wonders "Where's the beef?" in
Steve Harnad's conceptual and terminological salad ...; uh - let me be first
to prophylactically remind us - lest there is any confusion and forfending
that he should perforce of intellectual scruple must need refer to his modest
accomplishments  - Steve Harnad is editor of Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
and I am not, of course. We - all of us - enjoy reading such high-class
stuff...;-)

	Anyway, Steve Harnad replies to A.W., re "Total Turing Tests", 
behavior, and the (great AI) "symbol grounding problem":

>I think that this discussion has become repetitious, so I'm going to
>have to cut down on the words.

	Praise the Lord - some insight - by itself, worthy of Pass of
the "Total Turing Test."

>... Our disagreement is not substantive.
>I am not a behaviorist. I am a methodological epiphenomenalist.

	I'm not a behaviorist, you're not a behaviorist, he's not a
behaviorist too ... We are all methodological solipsists hereabouts
on this planet, having already, incorrigibly, failed the "Total Turing
Test" for genuine intergalactic First Class rational beings, but so what?
(Please, Steve - this is a NOT a test - I repeat - this is NOT a test of
your philosophical intelligence. It is an ACTUAL ALERT of your common
sense, not to mention, sense of humor. Please do not solicit BBS review of 
this thesis...

>... Apart from behavioral considerations,
>there are also functional considerations: What kinds of internal
>processes (e.g., symbolic and nonsymbolic) look as if they might work?
>and why? and how? The grounding problem accordingly has functional aspects
>too. What are the right kinds of causal connections to ground a
>system? Yes, the test of successful grounding is the TTT, but that
>still leaves you with the problem of which kinds of connections are
>going to work. I've argued that top-down symbol systems hooked to
>transducers won't, and that certain hybrid bottom-up systems might. All
>these functional considerations concern how to ground symbols, they are
>distinct from (though ultimately, of course, dependent on) behavioral
>success, and they do have independent content.
>-- 
>
>Stevan Harnad                                  (609) - 921 7771
>{bellcore, psuvax1, seismo, rutgers, packard}  !princeton!mind!harnad
>harnad%mind@princeton.csnet       harnad@mind.Princeton.EDU

	You know what is the real problem with your postings - it's
what I would call "the symbol grounding problem". You want to say obvious
things in the worst possible way, otherwise say abstract things in the
worst possible way.. And ignore what others say. Also, for purposes of
controversial public discussion, ignore scientific 'facts' (eg about 
neurologic perceptual equivalence), and standard usage of scientific
terminology and interpretation of theories. (Not that these are sacrosanct.)
	It seems to me that your particular "symbol grounding problem" 
is indeed the the sine qua non of the Total Turing Test for "real" 
philosophers of human cognition. As I said, we are all methodological 
solipsists hereabouts. However, if you want AI funding from me - I want to
see what real computing system, using your own architecture and object code 
of at least 1 megabytes, has been designed by you. Then we will see how 
your "symbols" are actually grounded, using the standard, naive but effective
denotational semantics for the "symbols" of your intention, qua "methodological
epiphenomensist."

David Harwood