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From: carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU (Richard Carnes)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Knowledge and the social sciences
Message-ID: <681@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU>
Date: Thu, 2-Jul-87 15:10:03 EDT
Article-I.D.: gargoyle.681
Posted: Thu Jul  2 15:10:03 1987
Date-Received: Sat, 4-Jul-87 06:57:58 EDT
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Reply-To: carnes@gargoyle.uchicago.edu.UUCP (Richard Carnes)
Organization: U. of Chicago, Computer Science Dept.
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>>  we are aware of the world through a `we' before we are through an `I'.
>>  [Charles Taylor]
>This seems more than a little dubious to me.  In fact, it seems
>blatantly false.  I would be interested in an attempt to justify it.
>[Frank Adams]

If it seems blatantly false, you may have misunderstood what Taylor
meant by this ambiguous and suggestive statement.  It suggests, for
example, the idea that we structure and view the world through
language, which is inescapably social or communal.  "You learned the
concept `pain', when you learned language."  How do you know a
certain color is `rot'?  "Ich habe Deutsch gelernt" (both quotes from
Wittgenstein).  Language and the culture of which it is a constituent
determine our awareness of the world, and in this sense it could be
said that we are aware of the world through a `we' (the communal
subject of common meanings) before we are through the individual
self.  This is why different cultures and different historical
periods see the world in different ways.

Taylor's statement suggests the social nature of knowledge and some
ideas advanced by Wittgenstein in the _PI_.  In _Understanding Social
Science_ (1985), Roger Trigg writes of

  "...the increasing emphasis on the *social* character of knowledge in
  general, and science in particular.  The very fact that science has
  been seen as a social institution, in which the notion of objectivity
  is determined by the structure of the institution, means that it is a
  fit object of study for the social scientist.  It is in this context
  that the attacks on empiricism have been so important.  If knowledge
  was obtained through the senses, it was clearly an individual matter.
  Each person could obtain knowledge in isolation.  If, on the other
  hand, it is a product of a community, it is by definition attainable
  only through education in the ways of that community.  Similarly,
  empiricism seemed to suggest that knowledge came in bits and pieces.
  Its approach was atomistic, in contrast to the view of knowledge
  which suggests that it is deeply embedded in the way of life of which
  it is a part.  Thus particular strands cannot be torn away from the
  wider whole. ...
  
  "Wittgenstein provides an example of this kind of philosophical
  approach, at least in his later work.  He emphasized the
  rule-governed nature of our practices.  Human activity is not to be
  understood as the isolated actions of individuals, and we cannot make
  sense of what anyone does except in the context of a wider whole....
  [This view] stems naturally from Wittgenstein's equation of meaning
  and use.  Words mean what they do because of the context in which
  they are used.  Meaning cannot be privately conferred, and is not,
  for instance, to be correlated with internal sense-impressions.
  Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of a `private
  language' are well known, although much of the discussion about them
  has occurred in the philosophy of mind.  How do we learn the word
  `pain'?  We can all communicate with each other about pain and teach
  the word, but it apparently refers to a private sensation....
  
  "...[Wittgenstein's] quest for public criteria as a basis for
  meaningfulness leads him to stress the social origins of thought and
  experience.  We are what we are largely because of the practices and
  institutions in which we are immersed.  Knowledge does not come from
  the atomistic experiences of individuals but is the product of
  rule-governed activities, which must be public and social.  A game of
  cricket cannot be understood in terms of the private intentions of
  individual players.  What they are doing can gain its sense from the
  rules of the game in which they are participating.  Boys banging a
  ball around a field with a bat are not necessarily playing cricket.
  Unless their activities are governed by rules, they are just banging
  a ball with a bat.
  
  "Where, then, do rules come from?  They are embedded in society and
  indeed constitute a society.  Rules make a society what it is.
  Different rules and institutions will by definition produce a
  different society.  Wittgenstein's views provide an invitation to the
  sociologist to describe the practices and rules of a society.  Once
  again, it looks as if epistemological foundations have been
  repudiated and only sociological investigation will throw light on
  the nature of society.
  
  "It is hardly surprising that Wittgenstein's views have provided
  inspiration for sociologists of knowledge, wishing to emphasize the
  social character of knowledge.  Although of very different origin,
  his notions fit very easily with those of Kuhn.  What is at stake,
  however, is not just a question about epistemology or sociology of
  knowledge.  Wittgenstein's opinions can apparently give support to
  all who stress the priority of the society over the individual.  If
  the activities of individuals only gain sense through participation
  in social practices, we have to look at the latter as sources of
  explanation."  [Trigg, pp. 23-26]

Richard Carnes