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From: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: What is a methodology
Message-ID: <108@thirdi.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 24-Aug-87 19:04:38 EDT
Article-I.D.: thirdi.108
Posted: Mon Aug 24 19:04:38 1987
Date-Received: Wed, 26-Aug-87 01:25:55 EDT
References: <850@klipper.cs.vu.nl> <3692@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl>
Reply-To: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Organization: Institute for Research in Metapsychology
Lines: 85

Re: article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> (and other recent submissions)
biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux):

Some comments on recent submissions by Biep.  I enjoy his stuff, and I think
he's quite courageous for sticking his neck out.  Of course that doesn't stop
me from chopping away.

>To me, "methodology" refers to the study; "a methodology" refers to a
>framework of methods, means to achieve something. The relation between
>a "method" and a "methodology" is to me a part-whole relation, where
>a "methodology" also carries the notion of being the "top". That means:
>one has "primitive" methods, which can be performed directly, and more
>complicated methods, defined in (more) primitive ones. Any such method
>defines a discipline (e.g. "volt-meter reading", or "making the dog happy"),
>many of which may remain nameless. With respect to this discipline,
>that "top" method is a methodology. So I think we don't really differ much.

In that sense, any method could be considered a methodology, with respect to
the "subroutines" contained in it, and any methodology could be called a
"method", with respect to any other method of which it is a subroutine.  For
instance, I have a particular way of startiing a car (put in key, turn to the
right, pump gas pedal, when car starts, release key and cease pumping).  Biep,
it seems, would call this a methodology, and the individual components
"methods".  But if one considered my way of driving a car as a "methodology"
(not one I would necessarily recommend to anyone, by the way), then my way of
starting a car would be a "method", as I understand Biep's definition.  I
don't think we are really talking about anything more exciting than means and
ends.  An end may be a means in another context or a means may be an end in
another context.  Why use a ten-letter word with an air of mystery about it
when one can use a five-letter word that everyone understands?

I am not sure whether or not the concept of a means includes the context in
which it is used, or when to use them.  The concept of the means probably tells
you *something* about the purposes for which it's used.  A screwdriver is for
screwing screws (though it could be used for other things).  But it tends to be
rather non-specific.  The non-specificness, or independence of context, may be
a virtue, as in modular computer programming.

>Of course, as I have written before, "philosophers aren't ready yet", that is:
>there is not (yet) such a thing as a (complete) methodology for any complex
>activity like doing science, and possibly there never will be (either because
>it isn't possible, or because it's possible but unreachable, or for any other
>reason).

Maybe scientists "aren't ready yet", either.  If they had their fixed and
ideal methodology all figured out, then all the problems of science would be
solved in a finite amount of time (the amount of time it took to go through
the mechanics of applying the methodology).  But, as I said, methodologies
(means) grow with the science.  I'm not sure a science that had its means
worked out in advance would be all that interesting (the only one I can think
of is the science of playing tac-tac-toe).

In another article (850@klipper.cs.vu.nl) Biep gives a clue about what he's
driving at:

>One of the hopes I have with this discussion is to find rules of behaviour
>that are absolute (= programmable). If I now just admitted you are right, I
>might never find any such rules. So let me challenge you to point out
>something which is or was really creative in science. Then I'll try to find a
>general rule catching that case. I'll promise to avoid any conscious use of
>the hindsight criterion in the use of the rule (but not in stating it, of
>course). I only hope I will know something about the field you'll choose.

That's useful to know, because it puts things in a certain context and raises
the question whether what currently passes for creativity might eventually be
subsumed under certain fixed rules.  What Biep seems to want to do is to work
towards relegating tasks defined as philosophical to humans and tasks defined
as scientific to machines.

My personal feeling is that, heuristically, it's a good thing to look for fixed
rules, but humans have a way of breaking rules or making new rules
(*improving* rules) when it suits them.  I don't know whether this faculty is
programmable.  I think there may well be a useful distinction between making
rules and following them, and this may (or may not) separate man from
machine.  But I honestly don't think this is the same distinction as the
distinction between philosophy and science.  I still think the correct
distinction is empirical/non-empirical.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge