Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!clyde!rutgers!labrea!aurora!ames!lll-lcc!pyramid!thirdi!sarge From: sarge@thirdi.UUCP Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: Simplicity and truth Message-ID: <119@thirdi.UUCP> Date: Thu, 27-Aug-87 02:11:53 EDT Article-I.D.: thirdi.119 Posted: Thu Aug 27 02:11:53 1987 Date-Received: Sat, 29-Aug-87 08:19:41 EDT References: <20297@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> Reply-To: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) Distribution: world Organization: Institute for Research in Metapsychology Lines: 37 Keywords: simplicity scope Occam Summary: I think you are talking about "scope". In article <20297@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> kube@cogsci.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Paul Kube) writes: >As I've characterized it, Ockham's >razor is a claim about the relative likelihoods of the truth of >theories, viz. that the simpler of two is more likely to be true. So >suppose there are two theories, T1 and T2, and let W1 and W2 be the >sets of possible worlds in which they are respectively true. Suppose >T1 and T2 have all the same observational consequences; then W1 and W2 >are both subsets of the set of possible worlds that, for all we can >tell by observation, the actual world is in. The question is: Is the >actual world in W1 or W2?, and we want to maximize the likelihood of >making the right guess. Well, the rational thing seems to be to pick >the bigger of W1 and W2 (and so the least restrictive, i.e. simplest, >of T1 and T2). But it seems to me that for lots of cases we care >about, W1 and W2 are going to have the same cardinality; and a >natural measure will assign them both the same measure; and then I >don't know how to say one is more likely than the other. Very interesting idea -- but it seems to me that you are talking about *another* criterion for desirability in scientific theories, namely: scope. Of two theories, we will pick the one that has the broadest potential applicability (something that explains *all* trees, not just grapefruit trees, for instance -- the biggest W1 or W2, as you say). And this makes sense, for the reason you give. But is it really necessarily the *simpler* theory that has the wider scope? That doesn't seem to be necessarily true. It seems that sometimes to generate a wider W1 or W2 of applicability, one might have to add complexities to the theory. It *might* be the case, but if so, an example or an argument to demonstrate this would help. I may have missed the boat totally on what you are trying to say. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge