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From: mouse@mcgill-vision.UUCP
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.unix.wizards,comp.os.misc
Subject: Re: Free Software Foundation (was: Re: Mach, the new standard?)
Message-ID: <893@mcgill-vision.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 19-Sep-87 18:38:47 EDT
Article-I.D.: mcgill-v.893
Posted: Sat Sep 19 18:38:47 1987
Date-Received: Sun, 27-Sep-87 23:04:27 EDT
References: <4950@jade.BERKELEY.EDU> <2117@eecae.UUCP>
Organization: McGill University, Montreal
Lines: 49
Xref: utgpu comp.arch:2254 comp.unix.wizards:4228 comp.os.misc:233

In article <2117@eecae.UUCP>, lawitzke@eecae.UUCP (John Lawitzke) writes:
>> Minix is v7 - (things you didn't know about, and don't want even if
>> you did), the GNU kernel should be 4.3BSD + (things) - (security
>> features).
> The GNU kermel should be 4.3BSD + (things) + (security features)

> What security features don't you want?

In general, anything which serves no purpose but security.

> Separate userids and passwords?

Lisp Machines have userids but everyone is a super-user, to use the
UNIX terminology.  They have no passwords.  They get by fine.

> File protection modes?

I could live without file protections.  (I already do.  My login has
uid 0.)

> Disk quotas?

I could DEFINITELY live without disk quotas.  We have them turned off
at the moment!

> checking the name of a system uucping in?

Close call (pun deliberate).  But if you are going to go passwordless
there is no reason to bother checking this.

I am clearly an extreme case.  Let's provide a larger-scale example.
We run a 4.3 derivative here.  Two security "features" I wouldn't mourn
come to mind immediately.  One was simple to disable and benign once
disabled; the other is inexcusable because NO MEANS WAS PROVIDED TO
DISABLE IT.  The first one is the "secure" option in /etc/ttys (all our
lines are marked secure); the other is the restriction that only users
in group 0 are allowed to su to root even with the root password.  We
had to recompile su to get rid of this one.

I don't mind security "features" if they don't get underfoot (eg,
distinct userids).  But when they do, I'd better be able to disable
them!  For example, Sun's NFS normally maps uid 0 into uid -2 for
remote requests, as a security "feature".  However, I can live with
this because Sun documents how to fix it and once fixed it is fixed for
good.  (Well, until the next release....)

					der Mouse

				(mouse@mcgill-vision.uucp)