Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!rutgers!sunybcs!boulder!pell From: pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) Newsgroups: sci.bio,sci.research Subject: Re: Dugway Biowarfare Facility--a clarification Message-ID: <2518@sigi.Colorado.EDU> Date: Sat, 10-Oct-87 17:38:19 EDT Article-I.D.: sigi.2518 Posted: Sat Oct 10 17:38:19 1987 Date-Received: Mon, 12-Oct-87 18:43:41 EDT References: <2476@sigi.Colorado.EDU> <6535@brl-smoke.ARPA> Sender: news@sigi.Colorado.EDU Reply-To: pell@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Anthony Pelletier) Distribution: na Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder Lines: 115 Summary: Restatement for those who didn't get it. Xref: mnetor sci.bio:717 sci.research:256 in response to an article of mine, Doug Gwyn writes: > (I write) >>Allowing the military to use modern biotechnology for top-secret warfare >>research is dangerous. > >Omitting "top-secret" (since security classifications are based solely >on probably damage to the national interests if information is disclosed), >your contention seems to be that there are certain areas that the military >should be prohibited from considering. Unfortunately, this is very naive. >Like it or not, nuclear, chemical, and biological issues are extremely >important for the battlefield of today. As a minimum, a responsible >military organization MUST determine viable defenses for such agents, >which WILL BE (and to a limited degree HAVE BEEN) used in actual battles. > Let's start by adding back the "top-secret" label, since that is what the army IS requesting (read it for yourself), and is the crux of the problem. I believe you will find that one of the points I made is that there is no need for legitimate defensive research to be top-secret. I have no trouble with the army funding research on vaccines. I think you should start by re-reading the original posting, since it seems clear from your response that you did not read it carefully, if at all. But I will re-iterate some of the main points. 1) There is no practical way to do "defensive vaccines." One can assume that the Soviets are not going to call the army and let them know on what new leathal organisms they are working. Intelegence can hardly be good enough that we can reasonably assume that we will know years in advance on what they are working. So against what, exactly, are we going to vaccinate? Vaccinating fighting forces is only reasonable if you know well in advance what new pathogens are going to be released. The only reasonable assumption is that the army plans to know what is going to be released because they are the ones that will release it. Furthermore, (2) there is no need to use deadly pathogens to test protective clothing and sterilization proceedures. There are plenty of non-toxic bacteria and viruses that can "stand in" for the toxic ones. Why does the military insist on developing deadly pathogens to test Clorox? You say that the army must be involved in research on this because it could be a weapon. Why? I am not trying to be unreasonable. It is not apparent to me why the army must have its hand in every potential weapon. It seems to me that one method to destroy life as we know it is quite sufficient. What difference does it make if the Soviets can destroy the world two different ways while we can do it only one way? You call me naive. Really? Do you really think that any leader of either "super-power" will surrender his/her country? Don't you think that, before giving up the freedom of Americans on American soil, the Commander-in-chief of the military will simply blow the enemy off the planet and risk the same happening to us. The USSR has signed an agreement that they will never use a nuclear weapon first in a war. I am not sure I believe them. But the US has repeatedly refused to sign the agreement and defended its perrogative to use nuclear weapons first if they have no other alternative other than surrender. I think it is clear where the government stands on this. So what reasonable use will anti-biological defenses have (even assuming they are possible). Long before the battlefield moves to America, the war will go nuclear. So this is not about defending Americans and American soil. This is likely to be about defending financial interests of US corporations in South-east Asia, or about fighting against guerrillas in El Salvador or as guerrillas in Nicaragua. As I pointed out, the only practical use of biological weapons at all would be in a small guerrilla effort where the "good guys" could be vaccinated in advance of use (did you read the original posting at all?). IN NO CASE IS A VACCINE USEFUL AS A DEFENSE. You have to know against what you are vaccinating. If you are going to suggest that "one never knows what will be developed--perhaps some universal vaccine," please first familiarize yourself with some immunology. Then, if you still want to argue that, tell me why it must be done in secrecy by the army, instead of in the open by the civilian research facilities. Doug writes: >The military researchers I know of have no more tendency to "bungle" >than civilians. Really? When was the last time a civilian research group killed 6000 sheep? Name a university biology research building that is so contaminated that it can probably never be used. Do you know of any cases of a university deploying bacteria from aircraft on a major (or minor) US city?; of a non-military organization that conducted their first experiment with nuclear chain-reactions under a crowded football stadium so that the cheering crowd would drown out any noise the reaction might make?; -spent $300 on a hammer?; built a tank that cannot withstand the force of firing its own cannon?; spent billions of dollars on a plane that can be brought down by a bird? You can't be serious. > Doug writes: >I think your best bet would be to agitate for a civilian review board >as an overseer of military bio research, rather than trying to "outlaw" >such research. I never said I wanted to "outlaw" (who are you quoting?) research of any kind. I don't have to outlaw the development and use of biological weapons...that was done in 1972 by R.M. Nixon when he signed an international agreement. I want to make sure that the army is not allowed to develop, in a secret, covert operation, illegal weapons. I maintain that whatever research needs to be done in defense can be done in the open where it is regulated and subject to peer review. To lay it on the line: I don't trust the army. I don't believe their motives are what they say; and if their motives are as they say, they don't need the facility they are proposing. Sorry for the redundancy. Some things apparently need to be said more than once to be understood. -tony MCDB Boulder, Co.