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From: yamauchi@SPEECH2.CS.CMU.EDU (Brian Yamauchi)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: The Success of AI
Message-ID: <287@PT.CS.CMU.EDU>
Date: Mon, 2-Nov-87 19:19:57 EST
Article-I.D.: PT.287
Posted: Mon Nov  2 19:19:57 1987
Date-Received: Fri, 6-Nov-87 21:52:28 EST
References: <1922@gryphon.CTS.COM> <131@glenlivet.hci.hw.ac.uk> <137@glenlivet.hci.hw.ac.uk>
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In article <137@glenlivet.hci.hw.ac.uk>, gilbert@hci.hw.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes:
> This work is inherently superior to most work in AI because non of the
> writers are encumbered by the need to produce computational models.
> They are thus free to draw on richer theoretical orientations which
> draw on concepts which are clearly motivated by everyday observations
> of human activity. The work therefore results in images of man which
> are far more humanist than mechanical computational models.

I think most AI researchers would agree that the human mind is more than a
simple production system or back-propagation network, but the more basic
question is whether or not it is possible for human beings to understand
human intelligence.  If the answer is no, then not only cognitive
psychologists, but all psychologists will be doomed to failure.  If the
answer is yes, then it should be possible to use build a system that uses
that knowledge to implement human-like intelligence.  The architecture of this
system may be totally unlike today's computers, but it would be man-made
("Artificial") and possessing human-like intelligence.

This may require some completely different model than those currently
popular in cognitive science, and it would have to account for
"non-computational" human behavior (emotions, creativity, etc.), but as long
as it was well-defined, it should be possible to implement the model in some
system.

I suppose one could argue that it will never be possible to perfectly
understand human behavior, so it will never be possible to make an AI which
perfectly duplicates human intelligence.  But even if this were true, it
would be possible to duplicate human intelligence to the degree that it was
possible to understand human behavior.

> Furthermore, the common test of any
> concept of mind is "can you really imagine your mind working this way?"

This is a generally useful, if not always accurate, rule of thumb.  (It is
also the reason why I can't see why anyone took Freudian psychology
seriously.) 

Information-processing models (symbol-processing for the higher levels,
connectionist for the lower levels) seem more plausible to me than any
alternatives, but they certainly are not complete and to the best of my
knowledge, they do not attempt to model the non-computational areas.  It
would be interesting to see the principles of cognitive science applied to
areas such as personality and creativity.  At least, it would be interesting
to see a new perspective on areas usually left to non-cognitive
psychologists.

> Many of the pillars of human societies, like the freedom and dignity of
> democracy and moral values, are at odds with the so called 'Scientific'
> models of human behaviour; indeed the work of misanthropes like Skinner
> actively promote the connection between impoversihed models of man and
> immoral totalitarian socities (B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity).

True, it is possible to promote totalitarianism based on behaviorist
psychology (i.e. Skinner) or mechanistic sociology (i.e. Marx), both of
which discard the importance of the individual.  On the other hand, simply
understanding human intelligence does not reduce its importance -- an
intelligence that understands itself is at least as valuable as one that
does not.

Furthermore, totalitarian and collectivist states are often promoted on the
basis of so-called "humanistic" rationales -- especially for socialist and
communist states (right-wing dictatorships seem to prefer nationalistic
rationales).  The fact that such offensive regimes use these justifications
does not discredit either science or the humanities.
______________________________________________________________________________

Brian Yamauchi                      INTERNET:    yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu
Carnegie-Mellon University
Computer Science Department
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