Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!hao!ames!oliveb!sun!cognito!randolph
From: randolph%cognito@Sun.COM (Randolph Fritz)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: language, thought, and culture
Message-ID: <45134@sun.uucp>
Date: 11 Mar 88 21:33:49 GMT
References: <44@gollum.Columbia.NCR.COM> <2894@pbhyf.UUCP> <888@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <326@thirdi.UUCP> <899@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <5776@dhw68k.cts.com> <5378@swan.ulowell.edu> <912@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Sender: news@sun.uucp
Reply-To: randolph@sun.UUCP (Randolph Fritz)
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Mountain View
Lines: 22
Keywords: thought modalities

Cliff Joslyn (vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu) writes:

  Consider seeing a gorilla or a whale sitting in one place, thinking.  It
  doesn't happen, they don't think.  They *must* interact wwith their
  environments to learn, to "move" mentally.

Cats sometimes move their eyes rapidly while sleeping.  The motions are similar
to the rapid eye motions (REM) of a human dreamer; cats probably dream.
Apparently cats can operate on representations not physically present . . .
don't know about gorillas, though.

Conversely, many humans engaging in those activities called "thinking" move
through an imagined environment.  Human activity and animal activity is, in
this way, quite similar.  Is there a qualitative difference?  I have been
frequently told that there is . . . but I'm not the least certain.  Perhaps the
only difference lies in the quantity of imagined representations and the
ability to manipulate them or perhaps in the interest in working with imagined
representations.
--
Randolph Fritz
randolph@sun.com
sun!randolph