Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!watdragon!rose!jjwlisenchuk
From: jjwlisenchuk@rose.waterloo.edu (Jason Lisenchuk)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: RSA Discussion and Speculation
Keywords: correction DES error proof public randomness security
Message-ID: <6053@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Date: 29 Mar 88 02:29:11 GMT
Sender: daemon@watdragon.waterloo.edu
Distribution: na
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Has anyone put forth any alleged weaknesses of the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)
Public Key Cryptosystem?  Is it possible that RSA is unconditionally secure
for keys longer than (the square of) the block length if these keys are chosen 
with certain number-theoretic considerations in mind?  

By unconditionally secure I mean that deducing the key is computationally
tantamount to exploring every possible ciphertext for a given plaintext,
i.e.  the 'randomness' in the key equals or exceeds that in the plaintext.

Is it worth abandoning analysis of DES?  Since DES uses a key of fixed length,
its primitive functions etc. would have to be redesigned to accommodate a larger
key whenever its computational security proved suspect.  Is this not a fatal
drawback in comparison with RSA which accommodates keys of arbitrary size?

Since RSA is mathematically-founded, is anyone working on integrating error
correction into the scheme? 
  
Jason J. W. Lisenchuk
4B Computer Science, Combinatorics and Optimization
Faculty of Mathematics
University of Waterloo