Xref: utzoo sci.misc:1134 talk.philosophy.misc:941 Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!ncar!ames!lll-lcc!pyramid!thirdi!sarge From: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) Newsgroups: sci.misc,talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Re: The nature of reality. Message-ID: <368@thirdi.UUCP> Date: 24 Mar 88 06:51:04 GMT References: <2868@gryphon.CTS.COM> <343@thirdi.UUCP> <732@actnyc.UUCP> <356@thirdi.UUCP> <741@actnyc.UUCP> Reply-To: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) Organization: Institute for Research in Metapsychology Lines: 136 Keywords: reality credibility validity Summary: My reality is "out there" like everyone else's. In article <741@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >]I was only pointing out that reality is >]what exists for a person. I think what we normally think of as "validity" is >]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to >]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard. A >]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting >]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality. A major aspect >]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe. Another is >]logical consistency. Another is aesthetics. But I think it is relatively >]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality. >At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that >this is not the way we use the word "reality". We can talk about someone being >out of touch with reality. We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her >reality. Whether we *mean* that or not depends on what our definition of "reality" is. But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person. And if we were to say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict. Can you think of a counter-example? >I believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out >there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at >least, to cross the street without getting run over. Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person. >I further believe that >others have access to that same "out there" reality. In other words, reality >is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring >life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you" >(gentle reader) out there in reality. (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know) Well, this isn't talk.religion.newage, so you're safe! Well, I certainly prefer your view to the solipsistic one I sometimes run across. My translation of the above is to say that there is considerable *agreement* amongst people and that that agreement will exist even when I am no longer around. >]I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is being [an ideological] >]imperialist. It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting >]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others. >Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true? Does that make you a >meta-imperialist? Interesting point. Is there no escape from imperialism? Well, I prefer to think that I am *offering* this reality to others as a useful one with a great deal of credibility, one that will enhance their world-view if accepted. So it's more of a sales job than an enforcement. It's not the *presentation* of a reality that I object to. It's the enforcement of one reality and the invalidation of others that I object to. It's like the difference between conquest and acculturation. >But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used. True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful consequences. >]I think [realities seem to have so much in common] because *people* have so >]much in common. There are certain rules >]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical >]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease >]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a >]computer program. So they will tend to agree on things that promote these >]characteristics in their worlds. >This begs the question. Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing >their world? Do they accidently choose the same rules? Or are these "rules" >part of a "reality" they have in common? Interesting question. I don't know. All I know is that we seem to follow those rules. The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people experience, only various characteristics of those realities. Completely different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but quite different from each other. My point is really a skeptical one: there *might* be some external reality that we share, but all each of us really knows is the reality *he* has and, to some extent, how it has been derived from prior realities. Maybe the commonalities we experience are due to the presence of some external reality that is not knowable directly, or maybe the commonalities have to do with some higher unity of consciousness. Maybe, as Sagan speculated in "Contact", God is trying to communicate to us through what we perceive as the physical universe and the discovery of truth concerning the physical universe amounts to a correct interpretation of what God meant. All these are fun as speculations. But it is best to start from what we are certain of: the existence of our own worlds and the principles by which they are ordered. >]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced* >]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all. >]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly >]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by >]behavioral means. >How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious? I don't think it can be proved with certainty. I think we can only infer from similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other consciousnesses. There has been a big controversy raging about Turing machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point. >]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful* >]without being *provable*. I can get an idea of what it would mean for a >]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it. >Is this 'idea' verbalizable? Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable >evidence? Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on >the screen that this image is concious? Maybe it's verbalizable, though it's difficult. It has something to do with having a viewpoint and having intention. If a machine had a viewpoint and had intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's intelligent (or, rather, conscious). I don't happen to think a machine *could* have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious. I wouldn't say an idea is a feeling, though ideas are commonly *accompanied* by feelings. A feeling is a phenomenon, an internal or external perception. Also, an idea is not a judgment. An idea is something that can be *judged*, as to its truth or falsity. In itself, it is not an assertion, so it can't be "proven". It simply exists, as a possibility. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge