Xref: utzoo sci.misc:1221 talk.philosophy.misc:971
Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!lll-winken!lll-lcc!ames!oliveb!pyramid!thirdi!sarge
From: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Newsgroups: sci.misc,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: The nature of reality.
Message-ID: <381@thirdi.UUCP>
Date: 30 Mar 88 06:49:34 GMT
References: <343@thirdi.UUCP> <732@actnyc.UUCP> <356@thirdi.UUCP> <27440@linus.UUCP> <363@thirdi.UUCP> <3558@dasys1.UUCP> <373@thirdi.UUCP> <998@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Reply-To: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Organization: Institute for Research in Metapsychology
Lines: 43
Keywords: reality credibility validity
Summary: Experience is prior to any physical model derived therefrom.

In article <998@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:

>At the bottom level, our maps, our minds, our selves, everything that is
>and allows us to even talk about maps, is our bodies.  It is
>*impossible* for me to visually perceive the world in a way inconsistent
>with my retina, optic nerves, optical ganglia, and visual cortex.  I
>*cannot* *perceive* the world of X-rays, or of ultra-sonics, or of
>micro-scopics, or of quantum tunneling, or a myriad of other modes of
>existence of the world (i.e.  "reality"). 

>So what, these things don't exist?

If we take as fundamental the physical universe model of experience --
particles crossing space and impacting sense organs; these diddling brain
cells, and so forth, then what you say about ganglia, etc., would be true.

However, experience itself is that from which the physical model is derived.
The physical universe model is, itself, but an *interpretation* of
experience (though a particularly useful one, for certain purposes).

What I am talking about is an epistemologically prior level of study:  the
study of experience itself:  the rules by which it is formed, received, and
changed, as seen from the inside looking out, as well as the rules by which
one interpretation is considered more credible than another.  This study would
also include an enumeration and discussion of the most basic abilities a
person has.  These elements form the subject matter of what I call
"metapsychology".  My view is that any physical model of experience would be
best founded in a sound metapsychology as an epistemological base.

So discussions of experienced, as experienced by the individual, cannot rightly
be contradicted by statements about the physical universe.

Ganglia, optic nerves, and the like exist, according to our current model of
experience.  But a discussion about experience cannot be reduced to physical
terms.
-- 
"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge