Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!mailrus!ames!lll-lcc!pyramid!thirdi!sarge
From: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Newsgroups: sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics
Message-ID: <367@thirdi.UUCP>
Date: 24 Mar 88 06:38:14 GMT
References: <344@thirdi.UUCP> <945@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <350@thirdi.UUCP> <968@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <357@thirdi.UUCP> <978@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Reply-To: sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode)
Organization: Institute for Research in Metapsychology
Lines: 173
Keywords: reality world facts ideas phenomena words concepts
Summary: I still think we have ideas, facts, and phenomena.

In article <978@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:
>In article <357@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>Thank *you* for engaging me.

I *try* to be an engaging person ;-)  .  No, honestly, it's one of the major
pleasures of my life to have interesting discussions with intelligent people
about significant matters. I only regret, sometimes, that it takes so long for
the interchange to take place.

>1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary?
>2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts?
>3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically?

1.  It isn't absolutely *necessary*.  But I believe that it *is* useful, in
that it helps to have a word to describe "a thing that might or might not
exist."  If "concept" is a poor choice, I am willing to use another.  I think
we often use the term in that way, in ordinary usage.  We say something is
"conceivable", when we think of it as "possible".  When Anselm said, "I can
conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived," I doubt that
he meant that he could conjure up certain mental representations.  "Conceive"
also means "to bring into existence", and before something can come into
existence, it must exist as a possibility.  Anyway -- not a crucial point.  The
important thing is not the *word* "concept" but the concept of a possible
entity.

2.  You test a possibilistic theory of concepts the same way you test anything
else: by an appeal to experience.  Most people conceive some things to be
possibly true or not true.  I merely assigned a name ("Concept") to that class
of entities.  And I think most would agree that what *represents* a possibility
is not the possibility itself.  So a word is not a concept.  So one can ask
people whether they conceive of things that might or might not exist, and if
people say, "Yes," the point is made that possible entities are part of
people's worlds.

>Perhaps a key to our agreement is my assertion that even common
>perception is a case of mental representation.  That is, my perception
>of an object is a mental image of that object, which is a visual mental
>representation (a very good, faithful one) of that object.  Of course,
>if I close my eyes and evoke an image of that object, that is also a
>mental representation of that object.  

Good point.  Yet in the ordinary view of things, people don't experience
themselves as viewing mental pictures when they are looking at physical
objects.  Undoubtedly, all kinds of filtering is occurring, neurologically.
Yet, experientially, there are some phenomena that are viewed as physical and
some as mental.  The difference may be one of degree, rather than of kind.
Those phenomena that are "closer" to the experiencing viewpoint (in a certain
sense of "closer") tend to be viewed as mental, while those that are more
"distant" are viewed as physical.

>>However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even
>>though he is not viewing them at that time.  These entities are *known*,
>>rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts".  
>>I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4;
>>I simply *know* it.  

>Isn't this really a case of remembering?  That is, in childhood I was
>taught that 2+2=4, and I believed it then, and remember it now.

I think that past events may be factual or phenomenal.  One can simply "know"
factually what happened in the past, without viewing any phenomena, or one can
recall actual mental images of past events.  I think both occur.  If, when you
know 2+2=4, you are recalling an actual mental image of past experience, then
it would fall in the category of phenomenon; if you just know it without
reference to any particular image, it would be considered a known fact.

A confusing aspect of memory, not resolved in my mind, is whether, in viewing
mental images of past events, one is actually viewing the past per se or
whether one is only viewing mental representations of it.  The ontological
status of the past is unclear.  Perhaps you or others have some ideas on this
point.

>By the way, I can still cast the above in a mental representational (MR,
>already!) theory (see my questions above).  That is, I have an MR for
>two, an MR for four, and an internal mechanism which relates the two
>such that 2+2=4. 

I guess the issue would have to be resolved empirically:  do you *experience*
mathematical calculations as manipulations of mental phenomena. Do you see
little numbers and symbols, much as you would do on a scratch pad?  I think I
do, sometimes.  But some things I simply know without calculating.  I see "2+2"
and I *know* 4.

>>Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are
>>simply *conceived*.  I refer to these as "ideas".  
>>"A unicorn in the garden", though not a
>>fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it
>exists.

>I think we've had this argument before.  My assertion is that in order
>to entertain a Sargeian idea, one must represent it in some form.  To
>me, your ideas are simply MRs which are created by the subject, like
>closing my eyes and seeing the object, or an image of the unicorn in the
>garden. 

I use the term "metapsychological" rather than "Sargian".  That is because I am
the very *soul* of modesty ;-) .

It may be that, in order to "entertain" a concept, it must be represented.  But
to me the concept is different from the representation (sort of like the
territory is different from the map).  After all, the same concept may be
represented in a variety of ways, e.g., in a variety of languages, or by a
variety of synonyms.  So is the concept some kind of "core" form of
representation to which all the other representations refer?  It doesn't seem
that way.  One representation seems about as good as another to express a
concept.  In other words, a concept, experientially, is not bound to any
particular representation.

>>I prefer the term "mental phenomenon",
>>though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent
>>anything.

>I might go for that.  In other words, if I have an hallucinaction, a
>visual pathology, or see some other meaningless (to me) pattern, that is
>not a *representation*, but rather a mental *presentation* (MP).  Thus
>while MRs are by far the most common form of mental phenomena, virtually
>swamping all other forms in normal people most of the time, other forms
>of mental phenomena are possible.  That's good.  All MRs are MPs, very
>few MPs are not MRs. 

Well, if we use "MP", you could see it as "mental presentation" and I could see
it as "mental phenomenon".  Then both of us would be happy.

>>I would
>>say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's
>>attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a
>>phenomenon.  

>You still haven't answered my point that these are all MRs.  On that
>interpretation, we would agree completely.

I would say, rather, that all may be represented, mentally (or physically),
but, again, that which represents facts, phenomena, and ideas is not the entity
represented.

And are you truly going to take the phenomenalist position that everything that
exists is a phenomenon (mental representation)?  That the only things that
exist are those that are directly perceived?  I somehow doubt that you would
want to take that position.  But if you want to avoid that position, then you
must admit the existence of things that are not perceived, at least, and admit
that certain things, not perceived, may or may not exist, which is my position.

I get the feeling I am not understanding your position well.

>Yes, I was too lax.  What I meant was that X and Y are the same in that
>they share a property, the property of being included in either the
>domain or range of R. 

Well, again I will try to exhume my old set-theory memories and get *real*
picky.  My impression was that only certain kinds of relations -- namely,
functions -- have a domain and a range.  Functions, as I recall, have a
certain ordering to them; they have a first component and a second component.
In this case, the quality of being a first (or second) component in this
relation would be a point of similarity.  Association, though, strikes me as
being possibly a non-ordered form of relation and hence not a function, so
there would be no range or domain.

But, as I said, I'm being picky.  I would say that, empirically, things are
associated both by similarity and by proximity in time (what might be called
*temporal* similarity, but I think would be best not thought of as
"similarity", strictly speaking).  And *some* associations are ordered --
including many semantic ones ("car" refers to a car, but a car does not refer
to the word, "car", does it?).
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge