Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!bloom-beacon!gatech!ncar!boulder!sunybcs!bingvaxu!vu0112 From: vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) Newsgroups: sci.psychology Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics Message-ID: <997@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> Date: 26 Mar 88 08:38:42 GMT References: <344@thirdi.UUCP> <945@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <350@thirdi.UUCP> <968@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <357@thirdi.UUCP> <978@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <367@thirdi.UUCP> Reply-To: vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) Organization: SUNY Binghamton, NY Lines: 151 Keywords: reality world facts ideas phenomena words concepts In article <367@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >No, honestly, it's one of the major >pleasures of my life to have interesting discussions with intelligent people >about significant matters. I only regret, sometimes, that it takes so long for >the interchange to take place. I share your sentiments, except that sometimes I find the lag helpful. It allows me to devote my full effort to a response, letting me rewrite, review, study. >>1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >>2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >>3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? > >1. It isn't absolutely *necessary*. Thank you! Moreover, I argue below that a representational theory of concepts *is* necessary to preserve any knowledge of concepts. Existence of concepts is crucial, because we shuold not theorize about things which we *know* do not exist. >But I believe that it *is* useful, in >that it helps to have a word to describe "a thing that might or might not >exist." OK, I think I'm willing to grant your definition of the concept as a possible state of affairs (PSOF) (NB: my dictionary defines a concept as 1) A general idea or understanding, 2) a thought or notion). However, I think I can show that this doesn't get you where you want to go. In fact, I think that the only possible positions are that either concepts are representations, or that concepts do not exist. It seems clear that (as you imply) the former view mistakes the reference for the referenced. This leaves us with the latter. The question is now what is the relation between a PSOF and mental presentations (MPs, as opposed to MRs?). In particular, are some PSOFs also MPs? I think not. One critical property of PSOFs is that they may not be actual. Yet to the extent that all phenomena are actual, so all MPs are actual. >We say something is >"conceivable", when we think of it as "possible". Ah, yes, but notice that there may be a critical difference between the concept and the process of conceiving. There is no doubt that we can consider and represent PSOFs (i.e. conceive), but what I am questioning is our ability to hold directly that which is considered, that which is represented, that is the PSOF itself (i.e. the concept). >When Anselm said, "I can >conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived," I doubt that >he meant that he could conjure up certain mental representations. I disagree strongly. In fact, he was thinking of a linguistic representation of God. I've noticed that you put heavy emphasis on pictures, images, and perhaps you've overlooked linguistic presentation. In particular, his definition is God := that X such that for all Y, X is greater than Y, or X=Y. This is a mental representation. >Anyway -- not a crucial point. The >important thing is not the *word* "concept" but the concept of a possible >entity. OK, but what is important about concepts (i.e. PSOFs) is that they may not exist. Thus when you say that when I conceive of (which I do allow, as representation) the pink unicorn (PU), that that "conception" is a concept, then you are saying that not only does the pink unicorn not exist, but also the concept itself (as a PSOF) does not exist. This is OK with me, but maybe not with you. On the other hand, if you say that when I conceive of the PU, the concept is then the MR of the PU, then it is clear that the concept can exist and the PU not exist. >So one can ask >people whether they conceive of things that might or might not exist, and if >people say, "Yes," the point is made that possible entities are part of >people's worlds. Same point: either it is only representations of the possible entities which are a part of their world (i.e. exist in their world), or there are non-existent entities which are part of their world. How can a non-existent thing be a part of my world? Only as mediated through a representation of that thing. >Yet in the ordinary view of things, people don't experience >themselves as viewing mental pictures when they are looking at physical >objects. Then they are wrong! There are plenty of non-experienced true things in the world, and one of them is that perception is a process of representation. >It may be that, in order to "entertain" a concept, it must be represented. But >to me the concept is different from the representation (sort of like the >territory is different from the map). After all, the same concept may be >represented in a variety of ways, e.g., in a variety of languages, or by a >variety of synonyms. So is the concept some kind of "core" form of >representation to which all the other representations refer? It doesn't seem >that way. One representation seems about as good as another to express a >concept. In other words, a concept, experientially, is not bound to any >particular representation. Excellent point. Which is a "better" representation: 2+2, 2*2, 2**2, 4, IV, four? Well, it all depends on your purpose in representing the number, and no doubt the number is not the representation. At this moment I am inclined to say that numbers, like Sargeian concepts, do not exist. I'm not sure the point you were trying to win with this observation. It seems to support my view that the concept does not exist, as well as the view that the concept is not the representation of the concept. The latter is true in general: the symbol is never identical to the referrent, but always similar to it. >And are you truly going to take the phenomenalist position that everything that >exists is a phenomenon (mental representation)? That the only things that >exist are those that are directly perceived? I somehow doubt that you would >want to take that position. But if you want to avoid that position, then you >must admit the existence of things that are not perceived, at least, and admit >that certain things, not perceived, may or may not exist, which is my position. Hmm, it is certainly true that not everything that exists is represented. However, it need not be true that everything that is represented does indeed exist, that is, it is possible to represent PSOFs. So I do admit the existence of things that are not perceived. In fact, we seem to have the general result that presentation and existence are totally disjoint: that is, things presented to me can either exist or not, and things that exist can either be presented to me or not. So to review, you claim that concepts are PSOFs, and thus possibly non-existent; you also claim that a representational theory of concepts is not necessary, so that concepts are possibly non-presented. So defined, concepts are the cases of entities that are neither existent, nor presented. Yet you still claim that (so defined) they are parts of our worlds?! Surely *this* claim is untestable! It's like the disease without any symptoms, or any cure! I claim that concepts are PSOFs, but that a representational theory is necessary. Thus a concept, in order to be part of our world, must be mediated by a representation of that concept. What's *really* interesting about this is that on *this* definition, the claim that a concept is *not* its representation, but rather the PSOF which is represented, is itself untestable, because a PSOF, in order to be tested, must be represented. Thus all concepts have associated representations, and we will never see a naked PSOF. If concepts are indeed naked PSOFs, we can *never know it*. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .