Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!mit-eddie!ll-xn!ames!sunybcs!bingvaxu!vu0112 From: vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) Newsgroups: sci.psychology Subject: Re: Emotion Message-ID: <962@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> Date: 18 Mar 88 15:04:29 GMT References: <44@gollum.Columbia.NCR.COM> <2100@phred.UUCP> <2103@phred.UUCP> Reply-To: vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) Organization: SUNY Binghamton, NY Lines: 62 In article <2103@phred.UUCP> daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) writes: >> I have heard suggestions that every (almost every?) action is >> associated with a particular emotional feeling. Certainly such >> concepts as pleasure and pain can be applied to most animals, >> especially the higher ones. > > I agree. According to the (poor) definitions that I have found, emotion >results when a cognitive drive towards some definite object is either >frustrated or satisfied. Since this definition requires both self- >awareness of desire and perceptual awareness of an object, it seems >to me that the presence of emotions can serve as a marker for conscious >self-awareness. I disagree, and assert that I can have unconscious or at least subconscious emotions (not denying that emotion is frequently (usually?) associated with self-awareness). For example, when I slip on the stairs, I get a surge of adrenalin, and my emotional state instantly changes to one of fear and exhiliration. Now, when this happens, I am typically self-aware, but not necessarily so. Let's say that I was thinking intently on some subject as I came down the stairs. Then it may take some fractions of a second after the adrenalin stimulation for my attention to turn from what I was considering to considering my peril. Or, I doubt that people in uncontrollable rages are always self-aware, but clearly emotional. Indeed, this is the insanity defense. > I prefer "taxis" to "tropism" in this context, but, in either case, >I think that there is a qualitiative difference between emotions >and tropism. Tropic behavior is a blind response to environmental >conditions: a reflex in which the character of the response is >completely determined by the character of the stimulus. >Emotional expression is not driven simply by environnmental >conditions, but by how these circumstances relate to cognitive desires. First, we always need to be very careful when using terms like "completely determined." Very few things in nature are completely determined. And that's exactly my point: I don't doubt that the simplest taxic reflex is normally determining, but suspect that very quickly as we move up the phylogenetic tree in neural complexity, that the organisms gains some small amount of freedom in their reflexive responses. Consider the octopus, a simple, but large, neural organism. I doubt that their courtship rituals are always identical, always determined. Strongly controlled, highly similar, yes, but the difference between complete determinism and strong control is exactly my argument on the quantitative difference between emotion and taxis. Or, do you really think the octopus is *self*-aware? To conculde, I deny that your latter point is necessary, although it may be common. Consider (:-}) the height of sexual passion, battle-lust, absolute depressive despair or grief. . .it seems these extreme emotional states overwhelm our consciousness to the extent that our self-awareness may indeed be temporarily absent. During these peak experiences, all we have "room" to be aware of is the emotion, and if we're lucky, the object of the emotion. > --- Dave Hampton >Reply to: uiucuxc!tikal!phred!daveh {Dave Hampton} O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .