Xref: utzoo sci.space:4911 sci.space.shuttle:611 Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!bloom-beacon!gatech!udel!princeton!rutgers!mtune!mtunx!whuts!mhuxh!mhuxt!mhuxu!mhuxi!mhuhk!mhuxo!ulysses!thumper!karn From: karn@thumper.bellcore.com (Phil R. Karn) Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.space.shuttle Subject: Re: space news from Feb 15 AW&ST Message-ID: <1001@thumper.bellcore.com> Date: 21 Mar 88 22:03:27 GMT References: <1988Mar18.042452.5673@utzoo.uucp> <993@thumper.bellcore.com> <5856@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> Organization: Bell Communications Research, Inc Lines: 35 Summary: SDI and nuclear war > >Considering that the human involved would have to decide whether to > >commit the United States to nuclear war, I would hope that by "human > >control" they mean the President of the United States. > > What kind of imbecilic nonsense is this? Deciding whether or not to shoot > down something that looks like a missile has nothing to do with committing the > United States to a nuclear war... Take a look at the X-ray laser program, widely credited with infatuating Ronald Reagan with his strategic defense fantasy. An X-ray laser is pumped by the detonation of a nuclear bomb. Deciding to shoot down what appears to be a Soviet missile with an X-ray laser therefore involves the detonation of a nuclear device in space within line of sight of the USSR. Considering that many nuclear attack scenarios begin with the detonation of nuclear weapons in space near the target country to generate EMP and blind sensors, the already paranoid Soviets could well believe that a US nuclear attack was underway and respond by launching their own missiles in a "pre-emptive" strike. Voila, nuclear war started by the defensive system that was supposed to protect against it. Even a non-nuclear "defensive" weapon, if accidentally used against a non-threatening Soviet launch, could create a crisis that could well trigger a nuclear war. Remember that most Soviet launches involve highly sensitive military C3I payloads that the Soviets consider important to their "deterrent". (Perhaps "we" know that we would never attack the USSR first, but the Soviets don't feel that way. It's their *perception* of our intent that's important here.) The Soviets might well feel that the "mistake" was in fact a deliberate precursor to a sneak attack, in which destroying the opponent's "eyes and ears" is the natural first step. Again, the temptation to "pre-empt" might become irresistable. So I suggest that next time you do a little research before you use phrases like "imbecilic nonsense". Phil