Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!cca!g-rh From: g-rh@cca.CCA.COM (Richard Harter) Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: The Liar Message-ID: <26626@cca.CCA.COM> Date: 5 Apr 88 18:43:27 GMT References: <8224@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> <26505@cca.CCA.COM> <8307@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> Reply-To: g-rh@CCA.CCA.COM.UUCP (Richard Harter) Organization: Computer Corp. of America, Cambridge, MA Lines: 71 Summary: Minor comments _The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity_, by Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Oxford University Press, 1987. It only costs $20; its ISBN is 0-19-505072-X. Buy this book. In article <8307@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@garnet.berkeley.edu (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) writes: >In article <26505@cca.CCA.COM>, g-rh@cca (Richard Harter) writes: >>Re the example of claire and the three of clubs. It sounds at first >>hearing that the difference [is merely adding contextual indentifying >>clauses, which isn't interesting; it can't be that simple.] >You are correct, it isn't that simple. For example, you can't "add" con- >text to a *self-referential* sentence. That isn't what I had in mind -- the example addressed the issue of a sentence being true by accident under a Russellian interpretation. If I say "Claire has the three of clubs", I may be mistaken in several particulars, e.g. the person whom I thought was Claire was actually Emily, or what I thought was the three of clubs was actually the deuce, and so. The example claimed that the Austinian interpretation took into account context, i.e. not only does Claire have the three of clubs, but also my grounds for believing this are correct. What I was asking was whether, in a non self-referential sentence, an Austinian intepretation can be converted into a Russellian interpretation by adding clauses adding context. One might argue or even establish that this is not possible. One might even show that the attempt to add full context will convert a non self-referential statement into a self-referential statement!! One might be able to show that this is true, but that the self referential character is resolvable or innocuous. I haven't read the book yet, so I don't know. However, at first appearance, the mention of adding context to a self-referential sentence is a red herring. > >>An immediate corollary is that it is not permissable to quantify over >>irreducible statements in the usual form of truth and falsity, because >>true and false are not correct categories for irreducible statements. >So how do you *identify* if a statement is reducible or not? You need >to know *before* you attempt to permissibly analyze a statement, accord- >ing to your above comments, and yet the reducibility may hinge on the >internals of the sentence. In general, you can't. So? Some statements can be immediately identified as being reducible -- others can be immediately identified as being irreducible. If you have a finite set of statements and all referents to statements can be eliminated, the statements are reducible. If you have a finite set in which all external references to statements can be eliminated, but there are internal references which cannot be eliminated, the set of statements are not all reducible. >Unless you come up with an *internal* categorization of reducible/irredu- >cible statements--and Kripke's example or variants thereof makes this very >unlikely--any such theory will always be vulnerable to just strengthened >liars. You as might as well stick to identifying truth. There is no effective procedure for categorization. This should be clear. But I have yet to see any justification for the claim that this makes for vulnerability for strengthened liars paradoxes. Indeed, the situation is the converse, a liars paradox cannot arise because the definition of truth is being restricted to that which you can actually determine. That is not the problem -- the issue is whether such an approach is useful. If you take a restricted view of 'truth' do you eliminate essential parts of mathematics and logic? -- In the fields of Hell where the grass grows high Are the graves of dreams allowed to die. Richard Harter, SMDS Inc.