Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!bbn!rochester!pt.cs.cmu.edu!speech2.cs.cmu.edu!yamauchi From: yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu (Brian Yamauchi) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: AIList V6 #86 - Philosophy Message-ID: <1579@pt.cs.cmu.edu> Date: 2 May 88 17:01:39 GMT References: <368693.880430.MINSKY@AI.AI.MIT.EDU> Sender: netnews@pt.cs.cmu.edu Organization: Carnegie-Mellon University, CS/RI Lines: 54 In article <368693.880430.MINSKY@AI.AI.MIT.EDU>, MINSKY@AI.AI.MIT.EDU (Marvin Minsky) writes: > Yamauchi, Cockton, and others on AILIST have been discussing freedom > of will as though no AI researchers have discussed it seriously. May > I ask you to read pages 30.2, 30.6 and 30.7 of The Society of Mind. I > claim to have a good explanation of the free-will phenomenon. Actually, I have read The Society of Mind, where Minsky writes: | Everything that happens in our universe is either completely determined | by what's already happened in the past or else depends, in part, on | random chance. Everything, including that which happens in our brains, | depends on these and only on these : | | A set of fixed, deterministic laws. A purely random set of accidents. | | There is no room on either side for any third alternative. I would agree with this. In fact, unless one believes in some form of supernatural forces, this seems like the only rational alternative. My point is that it is reasonable to define free will, not as some mystical third alternative, but as the decision making process that results from the interaction of an individual's values, memories, emotional state, and sensory input. As to whether this is "free" or not, it depends on your definition of freedom. If freedom requires some force independent of genetics, experience, and chance, then I suppose this is not free. If freedom consists of allowing an individual to make his own decisions without coercion from others, then this definition is just as compatible with freedom as any other. If I am interpreting Minsky's book correctly, I think we agree that it is possible (in the long run) for AIs to have for the same level of decision making ability / self-awareness as humans. The only difference is that he would say that this means that neither humans nor AIs have free will, while I would say that (using the above definition) that this means that humans do have free will and AIs have the potential for having free will. On the other hand, Cockton writes: >The main objection to AI is when it claims to approach our humanity. > > It cannot. Cockton seems to be saying that humans do have free will, but is totally impossible for AIs to ever have free will. I am curious as to what he bases this belief upon other than "conflict with traditional Western values". ______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi INTERNET: yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu Carnegie-Mellon University Computer Science Department ______________________________________________________________________________