Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-tis!ames!ll-xn!mit-eddie!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!bcsaic!rwojcik From: rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free Will Summary: Free will is connected to the linguistic concept of Agent. Keywords: philosophy Message-ID: <5392@bcsaic.UUCP> Date: 11 May 88 16:32:18 GMT References: <28705@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> Reply-To: rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) Organization: Boeing Computer Services AI Center, Seattle Lines: 26 In article <28705@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> dvm@yale.UUCP (Drew Mcdermott) writes: DM> Hence any system that is sophisticated enough to model situations that its own DM> physical realization takes part in must flag the symbol describing that DM> realization as a singularity with respect to causality. There is simply DM> no point in trying to think about that part of the universe using causal DM> models... I like your metaphor of 'a singularity with respect to causality'. It neatly captures the concept of the Agent case role in linguistic theory. But it goes beyond modelling one's own physical realization. Chuck Fillmore used to teach (in the heyday of Case Grammar) that simple clause structure only admits to two overtly marked causers--the Agent and the Instrument. This is a fairly universal fact about language (the only exception being languages with 'double agent' verbs, where the verb stem can have an affix denoting indirect causation). Agents refer to verbal arguments that are 'ultimate causers' and Instruments refer to those that are 'immediate causers'. He has always been quite explicit in his belief that the human mind imposes a kind of filter on the way we can view chains of causally related events--at least when we try to express them in language. One of the practical side effects of the belief in free will is that it provides us with a means of chunking chains of causation up into conceptual units. -- Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@boeing.com uucp: uw-beaver!ssc-vax!bcsaic!rwojcik address: P.O. Box 24346, MS 7L-64, Seattle, WA 98124-0346 phone: 206-865-3844